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Abstract
Since the recent focus on the Global War on Terror, both military and civilian theorists
have begun to “relearn” the intricacies of counterinsurgency warfare. We face difficult
challenges when confronting non-state actors that tend to attack in the time between
conventional battles and the establishment of stable governments. This research
compares and contrasts current counterinsurgency strategies (Hearts and Minds and Cost
Benefit Theory) by applying System Dynamics to provide insight into the influences and
emergent behavior patterns of counterinsurgency systems. The information gained from
the development of the models and from their simulation behaviors is used to construct a
System Dynamics model of a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy that combines the
influential elements and behaviors from each of the previous models to obtain a more
comprehensive model of the counterinsurgency system. This process yields behavior
patterns that suggest that security operations, critical during the short-term, are key to
disrupting insurgent organizational mechanisms that strongly influence the population’s
support for the host government and the coalition. The models also demonstrate the
strength of the influence of information operations on the counterinsurgency system.
Finally, the construction of the models and simulation behaviors propose that harvesting
host nation capacity throughout the counterinsurgency is the most influential factor for
maintaining long-term stability.
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THE HYBRID COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY: SYSTEM DYNAMICS
EMPLOYED TO DEVELOP BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF JOINT STRATEGY

I. Introduction

“Our Air Force is essential to that difficult form of warfare that we have had to
learn, or perhaps I should say relearn, in recent years. In Afghanistan …
American airmen are leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams. And many more
are on the ground helping to do things like build roads and guard facilities and
support local agriculture. You have been called to adapt to the demands of
counterinsurgency.”
(Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, April 14, 2008)

Background
Even though the United States has been involved in substantially more conflicts
involving non-state violent actors than nation-states since the end of World War II
(Barnett, 2004), it has not been until the recent focus on Operations Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom that military and civilian theorists have begun to “relearn” the
intricacies of this type of warfare. One estimate suggests that more has been written on
the topic of counterinsurgency in the last four years than in the previous 40 (Kilcullen,
2008). Throughout the years these conflicts have been labeled military operations other
than war, low-intensity conflicts, irregular warfare, and small wars; but the overriding
principle has been a group of non-state actors fighting for legitimacy and influence over a
given population (AFDD 2-3, 2007). While these non-state actors cannot match the
military power of the United States, leaders of these groups have chosen military tactics
that often involve low-tech, high-consequence actions that can lead to disastrous levels of
destruction. These tactics pose an array of security, military and political challenges that
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require great adaptability. Even though conventional forces sponsored by states are
outmatched by the strengths of the United States military, it faces difficult challenges
when confronting non-state actors that tend to attack in the time between traditional
conventional battles and the establishment of stable governments. The true challenge
then comes by understanding and fighting within the “seam between war and peace.”
(Barnett, 2005)
The question now arises as to how the United States military should focus their
attention in counterinsurgency conflict. Many publications on this topic originate from
reviewing historical examples and drawing conclusion based on case-specific views.
Even though past lessons provide a vital guide to begin looking at future doctrine, other
analysis methods are needed to effectively construct counterinsurgency strategy that
considers complex social system influences. This research will attempt to compare and
contrast current counterinsurgency strategies by applying System Dynamics modeling.
The goal is to construct system models that will provide insight into the emergent
behavior patterns of system elements. These building blocks of the system models and
the influences that tie them together will provide the necessary information to refine the
models of the strategies studied in order to develop a more robust application of
counterinsurgency assets.

Problem Statement
It is apparent that the insurgency process encompasses much too broad of a spectrum to
discuss and analyze in its entirety. This section will outline the emergence of the two
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counterinsurgency strategies that will be studied and provide a foundation for the
problem definition.
This research will address the two predominant modern counterinsurgency
strategies that have been derived from the reasoning of insurgency and counterinsurgency
theorists. These strategies are known as Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory. The
popularity of these two theories can be attributed, at least in part, to the
counterinsurgency research conducted since 1958 by RAND Corporation. Long (2006)
presented an excellent anthology to the creation of these contrasting strategies. Hearts
and Minds focuses counterinsurgency operations on establishing modernization and
economic development in an effort to increase the local government’s legitimacy and
gain the popular support away from the insurgents, while maintaining a military posture
that is mainly designated towards ensuring security. The most notable implementations
of this strategy have been the British counterinsurgency strategy during the Malayan
Emergency (1948 – 1960) and the current strategy in Iraq of Clear-Hold-Build advocated
by FM 3-24 (2006). This theory has been greatly supported by the lessons published by
insurgents and counterinsurgency strategists like Lawrence (1935), Galula (1964),
Guevara (1969), and Nagl (2002). Cost Benefit Theory, also known as Coercion, has
been greatly debated as of late for its contrasting views. This approach involves the
“buying” of support and insurgent cooperation though programs directed at obtaining
intelligence and seeking to disrupt the insurgency by focusing the elements of military
and political power on their organizational structures. The premise behind this approach
is that a population reacts to inputs to the system as rational actors; measuring their
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actions by considering the costs in relation to the expected outcomes. The game then
becomes an effort to shift the balance away from potential benefits for continuing the
insurgency. Similarly, this view has been advocated by theorists dating to and inspired
by the developments of the Vietnam conflict (Zwick, et al., 1964; Leites & Wolf, 1970;
Popkin; 1979). Recently the Coercion strategy has taken the form of “buying” the
insurgent’s cooperation by increased threat of military force and violent retaliation to
insurgent actions. One theorist suggested to "out-terrorize the insurgents, so that fear of
reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents" (Luttwak, 1999). Another recent
interpretation of Cost Benefit Theory centers around the premise that the insurgent
leaders and supporters can be “bought” through focused attention on amnesty and reward
programs (Kahl, 2007) or by rehabilitation efforts that place them back into a legitimate
governmental structure (Nagl, 2008).

Research Objective
There are three primary research objectives that will be addressed throughout this study.
The first is to attempt to consolidate the significant counterinsurgency knowledge that has
been generated by insurgent leaders and counterinsurgency experts throughout a wide
range of time and geographic regions. These lessons will be used to guide the
development of the system models and to provide context for their discussions. The
second objective is to build System Dynamics models of the Hearts and Minds and Cost
Benefit Theory strategies. These models will be generated incrementally; following the
phases of assessing natural behavior, developing influence and flow diagrams, and

4

modularly testing and validating the system construction. The insight gained from the
development of the models and from their simulated behaviors will then be utilized for
the completion of the third objective. This research objective will construct a System
Dynamics model of a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model by combining the
influential elements and behaviors from each of the previous models in order to obtain a
more comprehensive model of the counterinsurgency system.

Methodology
Much of the knowledge that exists on counterinsurgency is derived from case studies of
past engagements. Modeling and simulation techniques can be employed to provide a
more complete picture from which strategy can be developed. Even though other
modeling techniques, such as effects-based operations and value focused thinking, have
been used to describe insurgency, terrorism, and counterinsurgency problems, these are
not designed to conform to the nature of complex social systems. System Dynamics
takes a different approach than the previously mentioned techniques by not basing the
analysis on empirical data, but focusing on developing system structures by observing
individual components’ basic behavior patterns. This foundational emphasis on system
structure allows a System Dynamics model to rely on system influences more than on
abstract formulas or case-specific data. This technique has been greatly used since its
introduction by Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Jay Forrester in the
1960s and been applied to modeling problems in the areas of natural sciences, public
management, business processes, and insurgencies (Sterman, 2000).
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II. Literature Review

This chapter will include an extensive summary of the thinking on counterinsurgency
strategy. This section will begin with a look at the employment of insurgency tactics
from the perspective of historical revolutionary figures. This will be followed by classic
counterinsurgency lessons posed by combatants and theorists. Then, current
counterinsurgency doctrine will be summarized and placed into the historical frameworks
from which they were developed. Finally, an examination of recent counterinsurgency
research conducted through the application of simulation and modeling techniques
towards counterinsurgency, insurgencies, and terrorism will be outlined. It is the goal of
this chapter to examine these counterinsurgency philosophies, lessons learned, doctrine,
and research that will serves as a foundation for the development of the key system
elements that will be employed further in this research process.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Strategies
A summary of the classic insurgency and counterinsurgency lessons explored for this
research are demonstrated in Figure 1. The graphic depicts the range of geographic
regions and historical timelines studied. This is not to say that these cases are inclusive
of the all lessons learned for developing effective counterinsurgency strategy, but this
array has been selected due to the influence of the theories and their special and temporal
diversity. The discussion of these strategies, lessons, and doctrine will attempt to
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summarize the historical framework and identify the overlap and distinctions in their
perspectives.

Figure 1: Map and timescale of classic counterinsurgency theories and modern
counterinsurgency applications used for this study

The first major contributor to the classical study of insurgencies was British Lieutenant
Colonel T. E. Lawrence’s experiences as part of the British military advisory to the Arab
rebels fighting the Turkish Ottoman Empire (1916 – 1919). Lawrence, schooled in the
traditional military teachings of Napoleon and Clausewitz, began to see revolution as a
completely different endeavor. Before, he thought of victory as defined by the
destruction of enemy forces. But, as Lawrence (1935) accounts, even though the
rebellion had never defeated the Turkish army in open combat, they controlled a vast
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majority of the territory and employed their limited resources in the most effective ways
by attacking the larger army’s weaknesses.
When Lawrence’s approach is considered in the framework of modern
insurgency, his methodology can be defined as a Military Focus strategy (O’Neill, 2001).
In this structure, the insurgent force, Lawrence’s Arab Bedouin, maintained a
conventional military mindset while striking only when the situation was to their
advantage. At this pace they could transition into more traditional tactics as the will of
the Turkish forces was degraded through the asymmetric struggle. This approach is
common to many occurrences of civil war, such as those in the United States (1861 –
1865) and in Nigeria (1967 – 1970).
Lawrence’s contributions stem from the development several principals he
thought were characteristic of revolutionary conflict. He suggested that the army against
which the rebellion was being waged must be technologically advanced, and thus
dependant on their technology. It must also be large enough to restrict their movement
but not too large that they could easily control vast amounts of terrain. He also proposed
that an insurgent force must hold a base of operations that is outside of the reach of the
opposition and among the people from which they can gather support and supplies. On
the topic of support, Lawrence states that the insurgency must count on at least some
degree of passive support, if not their full involvement. He also estimates that the
fighting proportion of the local population supporting the insurgency needs to only be
about two percent (Lawrence, 1920; Schneider, 2005). Many that will follow Lawrence
as classic revolutionary thinkers will draw on his ideas and methods to define their own
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situations. But, shortly after that time period another rebellion was underway that
contrasted Lawrence’s theories and shaped the fundamental purpose of many revolutions
that followed.
From 1917 – 1924, Vladimir Lenin lead a starkly different sort of insurgency to
seize control of modern-day Russia. Lenin’s conspiratorial strategy sought to expel the
existing government by using outsiders to the ruling elite that held key roles within the
government and could mass military, political, and social support (O’Neill, 2001). Even
though this type of revolution does not generally involve conventional or guerilla-scale
combat, it is a widely employed form of insurgency that holds the same aim of
overthrowing the current regime or forcing social reform. Lenin drew as conclusions
from his rebellion that social, political, and economic discontent are necessary
preconditions to begin a revolutionary movement. He also stated that if the movement
was to be successful, it must be framed around an organized and conventional political
party – in his case Marxism. What Lenin failed to realize, or admit in his descriptions of
the factors that lead to the revolution, was that the existing government was in such a
state of disorder that it would have most likely fallen to any sort of organized opposition.
In the years leading up to Lenin’s revolution, the Romanov czarist regime had suffered
due to their ineffective and unjust governance, the perception of widespread corruption,
and an overall discontent from the widely unpopular Russian involvement in World War
I (O’Neill, 2001). These preconditions existed independently of Lenin’s revolutionary
plans and lead others who believed in Lenin’s social reforms to take different approaches;
most notably Mao Tse-tung in China and Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Cuba.
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Mao Tse-tung lead the Chinese revolution in China from 1945 – 1954 and was
appointed the first Chairman of the People’s Republic of China from 1954 – 1959. Mao
institutionalized the insurgent strategy of the Protracted Popular War. This approach
focuses on establishing prolonged levels of low-intensity military strikes on government
targets, while eventually evolving into a fully conventional military force that can defeat
the opposition’s army in conventional battle. Mao’s rebellion is one of the most studied
by scholars on insurgency and irregular warfare. His recommendations also focused on
many of the lessons of preceding revolutions. Mao suggested that the main component of
a revolution was to target the rural, oppressed, working class. Their involvement, as
fighters and supporters, would define the pace of the insurgency through the phases
described previously. He also proposed that strong leadership that is guided by political
principals (Marxism-Leninism) was also paramount. Finally, Mao gave great credence to
the belief that an armed revolution would need to transition to a conventional force in
order to achieve victory (Galula, 1964). This tactic has been applied in similar manner
by the North Vietnamese (1959 – 1975), Algerians (1954 – 1962), and most recently by
Moqtada al Sadr’s militants in Iraq (2004 – present) (FM 3-24, 2006). Retired US Army
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl (2002), a widely regarded counterinsurgency expert,
suggests that Mao’s greatest contribution to irregular warfare was recognizing that a
rebellion must consider paramount the interdependence of the military and political
components, along with the support of the populace. Even though Lawrence previously
mentioned the importance of popular involvement and Lenin gave great weight to the
need for politically and socially driven organization, neither connected the interrelation of
these efforts into the same strategy.
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Another Marxist-Leninist focused insurgency was organized in Cuba (1956 –
1967) by the Argentinean revolutionary Che Guevara and the would-be Cuban dictator
Fidel Castro. Guevara, who also led revolutionary movements in Congo and Bolivia,
employed a Military Focus strategy (O’Neill, 2001). But unlike Lawrence, Guevara drew
on the Socialist movement for support and used Mao’s interdependent factors (military,
political, and social) as the foundation for his actions. Guevara, who came from a well
educated, upper-middle class upbringing, wrote extensively about his theories. From his
writings three main mechanisms that he believed led to his success in the Cuban
Revolution can be identified: popular forces can triumph over an unpopular conventional
army; not all preconditions for a revolution need to be in place, they can be motivated by
the rebellion; and the rural countryside is the basic arena in which to conduct guerilla
warfare (Guevara, 1969).
Guevara and others have seemed to point out, time and again, that a popular
insurgent movement can wage and win a decisive victory in irregular warfare; contrary to
classic conventional strategy proposed by Clausewitz, who stated that wars by an armed
populace could only serve as a defensive measure (FM 3-24, 2006). These historical
examples from the perspective of different insurgency strategies provide great insight
into viewing irregular conflicts from this lens. Equally important, is to study the lessons
learned from the early counterinsurgents who faced these strategies. This perspective
allows modern theorists and strategists to draw more direct corollaries to current and
future counterinsurgency applications.
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David Galula (1964), experiencing this type of conflict from the perspective of
the counterinsurgent, provides one of the first perspectives in irregular warfare from this
vantage point. Galula was a French Lieutenant Colonel that fought the Algerian
secessionist insurgency from 1954 – 1962. The Algerian-Arab nationalists sought
independence from French colonial rule and followed Mao Tse-tung’s Protracted Popular
War doctrine (O’Neill, 2001). Unlike in China, the Algerian insurgents were not able to
make the transition to a conventional force in order to complete the cycle outlined by
Mao and the Protracted Popular War strategy. Instead, they were able to adapt to this
limitation and focus on the strategic stalemate phase where they engaged in guerilla
attacks in an effort to frustrate the government forces, gained widespread popular
support, and exploited French mistakes through propaganda campaigns (FM 3-24, 2006).
Galula suggests that popular support is as important to the counterinsurgent as it
is to the insurgency. Like the insurgents, the counterinsurgent may also rely on logistical
and active support from the population, but other factors such as intelligence gathering
and cutting off safe-havens for the insurgents also become increasingly necessary.
Galula (1964) regarded the counterinsurgent’s use of popular support as needing to
leverage the active minority in order to influence the neutral majority and defeat the
hostile minority. This is the first instance in which a strategist defined a population in
terms of their support and their relative composition. FM 3-24 (2006) echoes that
thought, defining the population as being comprised of a small insurgent portion, or a
sector of the population that supports the insurgency, a slightly larger portion of the
populace that supports the local government, and a majority that is passive or neutral.
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Galula finally proposes that popular support is conditional and can be gained and lost
relative to the actions taken (Galula, 1964). This factor may not be a revelation to many
who read it, but the fact that none prior to Galula had identified this point is a matter of
concern. Following this aspect of Galula’s theory would require insurgents and
counterinsurgents to modify their tactic based on their perceived level of popular support
in an effort to not lose what has already been gained.
Another important aspect from Galula’s approach was his identification that a
counterinsurgency must be waged from a primarily political perspective. He estimated
that counterinsurgency is comprised of approximately 20 percent military and 80 percent
politics (Galula, 1964). Again, this is a deviation from past traditional theories that
focused on combating an insurgency with a conventional military force and adapting that
force to fit a guerilla environment. As insurgents such as Mao Tse-tung have pointed out,
the elements of military, political, and social power are indispensable for an insurgency
to succeed; Galula draws on his experience to make the same parallel for the
counterinsurgent.
Sir Robert Thompson, a British Lieutenant Colonel, provided many lessons from
such an example during the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya from 1948 –
1960. The Malayan Emergency was started by the local Communist party looking to take
control from the British colonial government following the withdrawal of the Japanese
force after World War II (Nagl, 2002). The insurgency in Malaya, like those of China
and Algeria, followed Mao’s Protracted Popular War strategy and was focused in the
rural areas of the country that allowed for insurgent training, organization, and supply
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(O’Neill, 2001). Thompson sought to bring all elements of counterinsurgency power into
the fight: military, economic, and political. Like Galula, he recognized that a single
approach would not yield victory because the insurgents were exploiting every
vulnerability possible. The Malayan counterinsurgency also employed civic action teams
that led reconstruction, economic development, and spread governance throughout rural
areas. Thompson also sought to cut off the insurgents from the populace by recognizing
that they could hide within the rural areas, thus targeting these for government-led
development. He established an “oil spot” strategy, where development took place in
central locations that were cleared of insurgent presence and then improved by
reconstruction, the introduction of jobs, and an increase in commerce (Thompson, 1970).
This “oil spot” approach is also used in today’s Global War on Terror; for example, the
establishment of Afghan Development Zones led by Provincial Reconstruction in
Afghanistan and the Clear-Hold-Build doctrine in Iraq (FM 3-24, 2006).
Many have used Malaya as a case study for modern counterinsurgency operations.
Nagl (2002) drew comparisons from Malaya to critique the American military
counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. He proposed that the US military did not adapt to
the environment of irregular warfare in the same ways the British did and that this was
the deciding factor in US failure to control the North Vietnamese insurgency. While the
British tailored their operations to their perceptions of the population’s level of support,
the American military did not embrace this tactic and relied on more conventional,
effects-based targeting to conduct their operations. The case of Vietnam also added
additional domestic political considerations, such as an increasing rate of demonstrations
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against the conflict and the added involvement of non-military government officials in
direct operational planning, that further plagued the US efforts.
This section has provided a synopsis of the development of insurgency strategies
and the lessons learned from counterinsurgency efforts to combat these conflicts. The
following will introduce and discuss the development of current counterinsurgency
strategies that have emerged from the observation of insurgency theorists and past
lessons.

Emergent Counterinsurgency Theories
To “win the hearts and minds of the people” was a term first used by Sir Gerald Templar
during the Malayan Emergency to describe the British counterinsurgency approach of
gaining popular support through security, reconstruction, economic development, and
governance. During the period of the 1960s, what has come to be known as the Hearts
and Minds theory dominated the efforts to define counterinsurgency doctrine, especially
within the US military and research institutions, such as RAND Corporation. The goal of
this theory is to restore governance and order by gaining popular support for the host
nation government. The premise behind this doctrine is that economic instability and the
insurgent’s ability to gain popular support were the key elements that caused
counterinsurgencies to fail in historical examples. Kahl (2007), in reviewing FM 3-24 for
Foreign Affairs, discussed the validity of Hearts and Minds as a clear representation of
modern counterinsurgency efforts learning from lessons of the past.
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As the discussion of classic insurgent strategies pointed out, the focus on popular
support has been a largely dominant element of this debate. Thus, the main elements that
drive Hearts and Minds doctrine are those surrounding the gaining and maintaining of
popular support. Galula (1964) said that “military action is second to political” and
Hearts and Minds echoes that view by driving its main military effort towards
establishing security around areas where stability and the rule of law can be promoted
and propagated. Here Combat Operations shares an equal role alongside developing Host
Nation Security Forces, providing Essential Services, establishing good Governance and
Justice, and fostering Economic Development. All of these components are encompassed
under an umbrella of Information Operations aimed at countering the propaganda spread
by insurgents and broadening the reach of the host nation government and its
achievements (FM 3-24, 2006).
These key elements of Hearts and Minds are outlined in FM 3-24 (2006), in what
the field manual refers to as logical lines of operation. Combat Operations are aimed at
securing the local populace and national borders, separating the insurgency from the
population, and identifying and neutralizing insurgent structures. These functions are to
be conducted by integrating with the Host Nation Security Forces in an effort to train and
equip these elements of the local government and transition security responsibilities to
them as the situations arise. Notice that the focus is on promoting the host nation
government and securing the population, not on kinetic maneuvers that come to mind
when discussing combat operations in a conventional framework. The goal with
developing these Host Nation Security Forces is to build, train, and equip a resilient and
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stable security arm of the host nation that possesses strong leadership, adequate facilities,
and are trained in planning and executing security operations. In the area of Essential
Services, a direct parallel to the civic action programs Thompson described as having
contributed greatly during the Malayan Emergency, the aim is to repair or establish
critical infrastructure; such as transportation, water, and electricity. Other factors for
development are waste and sewage, schools, medical clinics, and public offices. The
Governance component of Hearts and Minds strategy seeks to gain legitimacy for the
host nation leadership by developing government planning for services and
administration, establishing the reach of the government throughout regional and
provincial areas, and instituting judicial order in-line with local culture. Finally,
Economic Development is intended to support free market initiatives, repair commercial
infrastructure, and stimulate the workforce through skills-development programs and the
employment of local contractors for reconstruction projects. The strategy also articulates
the need to align these key components around a robust Information Operations plan.
This factor is imperative in gaining information for the use of vital intelligence,
countering information to quell propaganda spread through insurgent networks, and
exploiting information that will boost the perception of host nation government
legitimacy (FM 3-24, 2006).
Nagl (2002) described “dollars” as the new bullets in the counterinsurgency fight.
He proposed that Hearts and Minds are directly targeted through programs like the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which is aimed at providing
reconstruction, introducing skilled workforce, and promoting economic development.
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The rationale is that these elements will help gain credibility for the host nation
government and shift support away from the insurgents, who are not capable of providing
these types of social and economic improvements. An increase in popular support should
also directly affect the quantity and quality of intelligence gained from the populace
(Human Intelligence, or HUMINT). Finally, Nagl also suggests that focusing on the
Hearts and Minds is all but impossible if the Host Nation Security Forces are not
effectively trained and equipped to protect the populace. The perception that the host
nation, and not outside supporters, is providing the security and services is paramount to
gaining and maintaining the necessary support.
But, not all strategists subscribe to the utility of popular support and economic
development as the deciding factors of a counterinsurgency. The Cost Benefit Theory of
counterinsurgency, also known as Coercion, emerged in opposition to the premises of
Hearts and Minds. This provided the first view of insurgencies and counterinsurgency as
a complex system to which known econometric analysis tools could be applied. The
developers of this strategy, RAND economists Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr.,
proposed that counterinsurgency should be less focused on gaining intangible measures,
such as popular support, and more about raising the costs associated with waging the
insurgency, thus ensuring that these costs would not provide an acceptable balance of
prospective benefits (Kahl, 2007).
The fundamental notion behind Cost Benefit Theory is that insurgencies can be
treated as systems and that the aim of counterinsurgency is to reduce their effectiveness
by raising the costs associated with insurgent actions. The proponents of this approach

18

also suggested that a population reacts to inputs to the system as rational actors;
measuring their actions by considering the costs in relation to the expected outcomes.
They also stipulated that irrational behaviors where caused by misinformation or
inadequate execution of cost-control triggers. Finally, they proposed that measurable
actions, such as acts of violence or terrorism, where more important evaluation factors
than attitudes, such as the perception of popular support or government legitimacy that
Hearts and Minds suggests (Long, 2006). The authors of this doctrine where intrigued by
the difficulty in measuring and analyzing counterinsurgency when compared to other
military analyses, such as nuclear doctrine. They questioned why military theorists could
struggle so much with a counterinsurgency system that provide a wealth of historic
examples and could be modeled using proven techniques, while tactics and procedures
for nuclear conflict were very detailed and highly agreed-upon even though they lacked
case data (Leites & Wolf, 1970). It can be speculated that perhaps this reasoning lead to
their selection of measurable factors as being fundamental to their theory in order to
develop analysis models.
Leites and Wolf (1970) describe what they believed were the factors that
contributed to their “alternative proposal”. From their discussion, factors such as
Impeding Inputs to the Insurgency, Destroying Outputs of the Insurgency, Building Host
Nation Authority Structure, Intelligence and Information, and Population Behavior can be
extracted as being foundational. When considering Population Behavior, this strategy
defines their actions as being based more on opportunities and the costs associated with
making choices (supply) rather than needs and wants (demand). It is also suggested that
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affiliation, a term which may be interpreted as behavior in support of the insurgency or
the government, is determined by the progress each side has demonstrated.
Even though the majority of the elements of Cost Benefit Theory have been
derived from the work of Leites and Wolf, others have followed with supporting
arguments. Farmer (1964), another RAND researcher, proposed that economic
development, as one of the characteristics of a successful strategy, may act to improve
support for the populace, but support in itself is not the required outcome. Cost Benefit
Theory differs slightly from Farmer’s view in that it advises that economic development
may not be an adequate input to the system because it has equal opportunity to aid the
insurgents; through resources and services that can be taken from the populace or even
given directly to insurgent supporters (Leites & Wolf, 1970). More recently some have
suggested that the Cost Benefit Theory can be taken to the level of “out-terrorize the
terrorist”, in which the host nation government and the supporting forces are able to
instill a sense of fear into the insurgent supporters to a degree where they no longer wish
to support the revolution because of the threat of retaliation (Luttwack, 1999). Peters
(2006) has also criticized the application of the “hearts and minds myth” in Iraq. He
states that even though gaining popular and international support are satisfactory
outcomes, the key elements to preserving national security are national respect and a
feared military.
In an effort to extract commonalities from the strategies presented, Table 1
summarizes the theorists studied, their particular time period, location, insurgency theory
used or witnessed, and the lessons generated from their experiences. Table 1 also
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includes the characteristics of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
as they pertain to the discussion of the theories presented.
An important similarity identified is the mention of some form of popular support;
the range of this spans Lenin’s implication that the revolution must be tied to social
reform, and it would be expected that this reform revolves around a popular belief, to
Mao’s reliance on the working class populace as the foundation for an insurgency. This
element is expanded by Galula and Thompson from the viewpoint of counterinsurgents in
that they must also vie for achieving some level of support. This focus proves to be the
instrumental factor leading to the development and use of Heart and Minds. Another key
observation is the understanding that this sort of irregular conflict involves more than just
military components; social, political, economic, and informational elements have been
granted much greater authority during a counterinsurgency campaign when compared to
a conventional conflict.
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Table 1: Table of classic theorists, time, location, insurgent strategies employed or faced,
and methods or lessons contributed to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Theorist
(Who)

Timeline
(When)

Location
(Where)

Strategy
(What)

T.E.
Lawrence

1916 - 1919

Saudi Arabia

Military Focus

Vladimir
Lenin

1917 - 1924

Russia

Conspiratorial

Mao Tse-tung

1945 - 1954

China

Protracted
Popular War

Robert
Thompson

1948 - 1960

Malaya

Hearts and
Minds

David Galula

1954 - 1962

Algeria

Hearts and
Minds

Ernesto
Guevara

1956 - 1967

Cuba, Congo,
Bolivia

Military Focus

Nathan Leites
& Charles
Wolf

1959 - 1975

Vietnam

Cost Benefit

2001 - Present

Iraq, Afghanistan

Hearts and
Minds

FM 3-24

Lessons/Methods
(How)
 Unassailable base
 Exploit enemy’s
technological dependence
 Out-maneuver larger enemy
 At least passive popular
support
 Sufficient weaponry
 Lead by influential outsiders
 Social, economic, political
discontent pre-requirement
 Framed around Marxist
values
 Strong involvement of
working class
 Leadership guided by
political reform
 Evolve from guerilla to
conventional
 Interdependence of military,
government, populace
 Must address all facets of
insurgency
 Civic action teams
 Cut-off insurgents from
populace
 “Oil spot” approach
 Popular support important
for COIN
 Leverage active minority
 Popular support conditional
 Popular forces can defeat
conventional army
 Not all preconditions for
rebellion required
 Rural areas stage for guerilla
combat
 Raise costs of insurgency
 Guided my measurable
actions
 Attack inputs to insurgency
 Clear-Hold-Build
 Focus on Neutral/Passive
population

Modeling and Simulating Counterinsurgency
Modeling research geared towards insurgency and terrorism has taken on many forms.
This section will discuss several of those techniques and provide a framework for the
development of a technique that will be useful to meet the goal of this research.
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An example of a modeling technique applied to insurgencies is called effectsbased operations. Here, the development of network flows and risk analysis has been
used to identify nodes of interests or centers of gravity in the insurgent networks and to
determine optimal courses of action for counterinsurgent forces (Umstead, 2005). This
particular study, like many other operational research methods in insurgency and military
simulation, focuses on political, economic, social, infrastructure, and information system
factors. Another methodology that has been used is that of influence node analysis. This
tool provides decision makers with a graphical representation of causal relationships
between system actions or events and probabilistic regressions that can predict outcomes
(Fatur, 2005). A variant methodology is termed Bayesian network analysis and is used to
develop qualitative knowledge and probabilistic estimates of system behaviors based on
expert input (Faizen & Priest, 2004). Social networks have also been applied to national
stability analysis by combining simulation techniques with social interactions within the
studied systems. Here social interactions and interconnections are identified and modeled
in order to exploit these relationships and predict their behaviors (Renfro & Dekro,
2003). Other techniques have also been applied to the study of counterinsurgency,
examples such as game theory (Pate-Cornell & Guikema, 2002) and value focused
thinking (Pruitt, 2003), have presented alternative to aid decision makers in
understanding these complex systems.
One modeling technique that has been very effective at simulating complex social
systems, such as a counterinsurgency, and that requires very little empirical data is
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System Dynamics. This method has been applied to modeling problems in the areas of
natural sciences, public management, business processes, and insurgencies.
In the area of System Dynamics modeling, the first attempt to model
counterinsurgency warfare came from R. G. Coyle (1985). He employed a generalized
view of insurgencies based on literature from Galula, Thompson, Guevara, and others.
He decided to not focus on a single scenario, such as Algeria or Malaya, for developing
his system model because he thought that there was sufficient variety of information
provided from different times and locations that a generalized view could be constructed
into a useful model. What he did not incorporate was any prevailing strategy. When
Coyle constructed his model, he did so in a gradual approach that allowed the reader to
follow his logic in establishing influences. He then identified the closed influence
feedback loops that governed the systems (persuasion, logistics, and compulsion loops)
and determined which and how these components where influenced by each other in the
system. Coyle used his model to propose policy options, which, based on the model
influences, would provide insight into this complex social system. This study provides
an excellent starting point for future study, because it demonstrates the applicability of
this method towards the study of counterinsurgency. The methodology was limited in
that the model was not simulated mathematically to study emergent behavior patterns of
the system components or to determine how much government political and social
support would affect insurgent strength, for example. Surprisingly, the study has not
been referenced by any of the subsequent System Dynamics efforts discussed in the
remainder of this section.
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The next application of System Dynamics in counterinsurgency research did not
occur for another twenty years. This hiatus comes in time when the Cold War and
Network Centric Operations dominated military thinking and the Pentagon would rather
forget about being involved in another Vietnam (Barnett, 2005), and it is not until the US
launches the Global War on Terrorism that this scenario begins to receive further
scrutiny. Among the efforts to study counterinsurgency that emerged during this time
was a new-found focus on the applicability of System Dynamics towards irregular
warfare. One such study, that originated from the Naval Postgraduate School, focused on
counterinsurgency by evaluating the US military involvement in fighting Middle Eastern
terrorist groups (Alcantara et al., 2005). The research considered policy interactions and
how the influences within the system affected component behavior. In contrast to Coyle,
this study was able to bridge the gap between conceiving influences and observing
behavior by actually simulating the model. Their simulated model included relations
between the US military involvement in the Middle East, the behavior of the terrorist
groups, and the US allocation of resources to the Global War on Terrorism. Even though
their counterinsurgency background addressed classic philosophies, they failed to include
vital characteristics into their system model; host nation capabilities, popular support, and
economic development were all lacking. The construction of the initial influence model
also did not address why influences where selected and how strong and to what degree
these influences controlled the system. This methodology could be applied in future
work by considering basic system behavioral structures (Sterman, 2000) or classical
component archetypes (Senge, 1990).
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Shortly after the thesis by Alcantara et al. was completed, an article appeared in
Parameters, the publication from the US Army War College, which addressed some of
these concerns. Although Baker (2006) may not have heard of the work by Alcantara et
al., he began his look at counterinsurgency by discussing the system structures and basic
archetypes that might lead him towards an effective model. This study was also of
interest because it developed an influence model based on current counterinsurgency
doctrine and included characteristics like popular support, security, intelligence, and local
government legitimacy. He also built the model gradually so as to rationalize the
influences and maintain an appropriate level of strategic focus. Correctly aggregating
system components allows only the major contributors to influence the system and keeps
the model developer from adding far more detail than necessary for the analysis. Again,
the major limitation of this study was not viewing the system’s behavior through
simulation.
The counterinsurgency philosophies and doctrine discussed in this chapter will
serves as a foundation for the development of the key system elements that will be
employed in the analysis. The next chapter will introduce the elements of System
Dynamics and further explore its viability as an instrument to model complex social
systems. The section will also demonstrate the development of the System Dynamics
models throughout their stages in an effort to logically and iteratively assemble the final
products, incorporating the elements of the counterinsurgency systems explored from this
literature review.
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III. Methods

This chapter will introduce the concepts of System Dynamics and the methodology
employed in this study. First, the following sections will describe the fundamentals of
System Dynamics modeling and introduce the terminology that will be used throughout
this research. This section will outline and discuss the nature of the feedback loops that
are present in dynamic systems and the construction of the various diagrams that will be
used to model the system behavior. Finally, the methodology for sequentially and
iteratively constructing System Dynamics models will be summarized.
The first concept that will be introduced is that of the reference mode. The
reference mode is the notional representation of basic system behavior patterns over time.
For example, a population system may initially grow slowly as it is faced with its
environment, then begin to more rapidly grow as it begins to adapt, and then reach a
steady state as it is limited by resources or other constraints. When a complex system,
like a population, is observed in this natural state where exogenous influences are not
considered, the natural behavior can be observed and its reference mode pattern can be
constructed.
The reference modes can take one of several basic functions. As seen with the
previous example, if the growth of a population were plotted over time, an S-Shaped
curve would be expected. Similarly, systems can take on the form of a Goal Seeking or
Oscillating pattern. Some of the common reference mode diagrams are seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Common Reference Mode Diagrams, from Sterman (2000).

In all systems, a set of feedback loops work to reinforce or compensate the actions
within the system. In the case of a Reinforcing Loop, an action sets in motion a reaction
that escalates the original action. Several simple examples of this phenomenon are funds
growing in a bank account as interest compounds or a snow ball rolling down hill and
increasing in size. On the other hand, a Compensating Loop works to balance the system
behavior and keep an action from intensifying.
As a matter of example, the Popular Support variable that will be a central part of
the Hearts and Minds model will be analyzed in this manner. First, the reference mode
for the variable is considered. When Popular Support is examined as a stand-alone
entity, it is intuitive to suggest that its natural behavior will cause a drain in support for
the insurgency or counterinsurgency over time until all of the support is dissipated. This
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1st Order Draining nature is only observed in a theoretical sense because of the definition
of the reference mode that no other aspects of the system are influencing it; in other
words, the government, insurgency, or a coalition force are not acting to influence
support one way or another. Thus the reference mode of this natural behavior can be
represented by the graphic in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Reference Mode Diagram of Natural Behavior of Popular Support in the Hearts
and Minds model.

For this reference mode diagram, a particular influence diagram is defined that relates to
this behavior. An influence diagram illustrates a combination of system elements and
their relations to one another. In the case of the Popular Support variable as applied to
the Heart and Minds model, the influence diagram is demonstrated in Figure 4. The
generic 1st Order Draining Structure shows the compensating behavior that is inherent in
this structure.
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Figure 4: Influence Diagram of Natural Behavior of Popular Support in Hearts and
Minds model.

During the model’s construction, the procedure for developing the reference mode and
influence diagrams would continue for each system element. This process would
continue to follow the intuitive approach of designating the natural component behavior
that best matches the characteristics of the given variable and associating this behavior
with a known influence. At this point the system can begin to take shape as individual
elements are connected to reveal reinforcing or compensating loops that have formed
from the composition of the system.
Following the convention of iterative and sequential construction, when the model
is ready to be operationalized mathematically, the system elements are then constructed
individually in order to validate natural system behavior and then connected
incrementally. The influence diagrams are operationalized into flow diagrams where
stocks and flows are explicitly identified. A stock is a model state variable that has an
accumulating or draining value over time as influenced by its associated inflows and
outflows.
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In the current example, Popular Support is the stock that is influenced by the flow
of Drain on Support. The remaining element identified in the flow diagram, the Popular
Support Flow Factor, serves as parameters to physically constrain the model to the limits
envisioned in the development of the reference mode and influence diagram and to serves
as a converter or coefficients that links other potential influences together. The flow
diagram and model behavior associated with the Popular Support element are shown in
Figure 5.

Figure 5: Flow Diagram and behavior of Popular Support in Hearts and Minds model
simulated in STELLA 9.

Now the system can begin to interact among all of the elements that would be taken to
the flow diagram stage. This step of sequentially connecting system elements, as with all
other steps, is done incrementally, and the behavior is observed after each step in order to
validate the system structure as the model is constructed. This emergent behavior is
compared to the assumed behavior pattern hypothesized after the influence diagrams for
each element are connected to complete system. Unexpected behavior can lead to the
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detection of flaws in the model or to the realization of true system behavior that provides
better insight into the system’s behavior.
Thus far the model has been constructed in a systematic manner by starting with a
reference mode behavior for the basic components of the system and developing those
further into an influence diagram and a flow diagram in the simulation software. Equally
important to this procedure is a thorough validation process that tests the model’s
structure, behavior, and boundary. This step accumulates confidence in the model’s
development and utility as a simulation tool of the actual event. As stated before, in
System Dynamics models, statistical analysis tests are not generally applicable due to the
cause-and-effect nature of System Dynamics as opposed to the correlation nature of a
statistical approach.
The first set of testing to be conducted on the model will focus on the model
structure. These tests, the Structure Verification, Parameter Verification, Extreme
Conditions and Boundary Adequacy tests, are compared to the descriptive knowledge of
the system. Both the Structure and Parameter Verification tests are conducted throughout
the construction of the model. Along every point in the model where system components
are constructed, the system structure and parameters are carefully considered for their
physical significance. The Extreme Conditions test is applied to the system model in
order to examine the model’s performance under conditions beyond the normal operating
range. The Boundary Accuracy test focuses on determining that the model has the
correct level of aggregation, while still including all relevant system components. Figure
6 illustrates the correct aggregation level of System Dynamic models that consider a
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balance of breadth and depth. As the figure shows, the challenge is to avoid widening the
breadth of the system boundary before reaching an appropriate level of aggregation.

Figure 6: Effective level of aggregation for System Dynamics modeling, from IThink
(2001).

The next series of tests focus on the model’s behavior. These tests attempt to compare
the simulated behavior to the observed or intuitive behavior of the actual event. These
first tests are the Behavior Reproduction Test, the Behavior Anomaly Test, the Family
Member Test, and the Boundary Adequacy Test. All of these tests are conducted by
observing the emergent behavior of the model during constructing and tracing anomalous
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or undesired behavior back to a structural component of the model. It is important to
note that the main cause of model failures due to behavior is because of exogenous
influences built into the model to “force” a certain behavior pattern, instead of the
patterns being directly associated with a clear and physically meaningful system
structure. The behavior test that will be conducted after the system is constructed is the
Behavior Sensitivity Test. This test explores the range of parameters in which the model
can maintain a reasonable behavior pattern.
This validation process serves to gain more insight into the model construction
and allow for more confidence in the research methodology. The model construction and
validation is conducted in stages and sequentially iterated to avoid unexpected behavior
or flawed system structure. The validation does not focus on conducting statistical
analysis of the model’s output against historical data. This would lead to forcing the
model to fit constrained regressions developed with empirical data that would reduce the
validity and usefulness of the System Dynamics model. Rather, the validation focuses on
ensuring the system structure, behavior, and boundary are correctly constructed,
adequately aggregated, and sequentially verified against the dynamic hypothesis.
The next chapter will demonstrate the development of the system models of the
Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory counterinsurgency strategies. The chapter
will also draw from the insight gained from both models’ influences and behaviors to
determine the preferred method for generating the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy
model that will address the lessons learned during the study of the previous models.
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IV. Analysis and Results

The previous chapters of this research have served to establish the framework of the
study by detailing the need for developing a counterinsurgency strategy model, the
background and historic influences that guide its construction, and the methodology that
will be employed. This chapter explains in detail the incremental process for developing
each of the components of a System Dynamics model and replicates that procedure for
the various models that will be evaluated, tested, validated, and simulated. This section
will also discuss the expected and emergent behavior patterns that are viewed throughout
the development of these models. Finally, this section will use the information and
insight gained from the models’ behaviors to yield a comprehensive counterinsurgency
model that can aid policy makers in understanding the elements and influences that guide
this level of warfare.

Reference Modes and Natural Behaviors of the Hearts and Minds Model
As outlined in Chapter 3, the general modeling process starts by examining all of the
model elements for their viability as having a reference mode behavior. This implies that
not all of the model’s components will fall into a basic category of natural behaviors that
can be identified by a reference mode behavior pattern. Some elements will function as
stand-alone parts of the overall model. Other elements may also seem to exhibit a natural
behavior that does not conform to the standard reference mode patterns, and, in these
cases, it is very likely that the elements can be further disaggregated into more basic
components. For the purposes of the Hearts and Minds model, and subsequently the Cost
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Benefit Theory model, the model’s elements were seen to have a natural behavior that
follows the standard reference modes or did not demonstrate a natural behavior. The
elements of the Hearts and Minds model as well as their natural behavior are summarized
in Table 2.
Table 2: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Hearts and Minds model.
Model Element
Popular Support
Coalition Combat Operations
Host Nation Security Forces
Essential Services
Governance
Host Nation Economy
Information Operations
Resentment
Coalition Investment

Natural Behavior
1st Order Draining
Oscillation
Oscillation
S‐Shaped
S‐Shaped
S‐Shaped
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior

The first element studied for the Hearts and Minds model is that of Popular Support.
Insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists dating back to Lawrence (1935), and most
notably Galula (1964), have deemed support from the local populace as a necessity for
successful counterinsurgency. From an insurgent’s perspective, Popular Support
provides logistical advantages, safe havens for organizing forces and evading government
forces, and as a pool for recruiting for their cause. Whereas, for the counterinsurgent,
support conveys added intelligence and a limitation of the supplies, hideouts, and
recruiting that insurgencies require. (FM 3-24, 2006)
Human nature can attest to a behavior of gaining and losing interest in a particular
subject; Popular Support gained or lost for the insurgency functions in much the same
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way. If, for example, a situation exists in which Popular Support is high for one side as
an initial condition, then lack of action from that side, which is a condition for observing
the natural behavior, would cause a loss in interest for that particular side. This does not
conclude that a loss of support for one side equates to a gain to the other, but more
specifically a trend towards neutrality. This natural behavior model can be described by
a simple 1st Order Draining structure that gradually declines to zero. An example of the
reference mode diagram and the graphical depiction of the behavior are shown in Figure
7 (Shelley, 2008).

Figure 7: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of Draining Structure.

The next two elements of the Hearts and Minds model that will be evaluated are
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces. These elements are
merged in the environment of counterinsurgency because of their dynamic interactions
and synergistic opportunities. Nagl (2008) stated that “foreign forces can't win a
counterinsurgency campaign, only local forces can do that.” It is the local government’s
security forces, military and law enforcement, augmented and trained by their foreign
allies that can approach the local populace and maintain the presence of security without
allowing their actions to seem like an invasion. Thus, when observing these two
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elements from the perspective of their natural behavior, it is apparent that their levels are
strongly dependent and complementary; as more coalition forces train and equip the host
nation’s forces, then less coalition troops are required, until the level of host nation
personnel begins to fall again. This behavior follows an Oscillating reference mode
construction and can be described by the diagram and graph in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of Oscillating
Structure.

The next category of elements of the Hearts and Minds model are those that display an SShaped reference mode behavior: Essential Services, Governance, and Host Nation
Economy. These elements, which entail all of the water, power, sanitation, and
transportation infrastructure, the local and national government facilities and
organization, and the state of an individual’s and the nation’s finances, are unmistakably
major contributors to the counterinsurgency efforts. Galula (1964) stipulated that it was
these elements, the political side of counterinsurgency, which made up 80 percent of the
contribution. Initially, one can speculate that the three elements could be combined into a
single local governmental factor. But upon study of the Hearts and Minds theory and
reflection upon their individual contributions, the model features these components as
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separate entities that interact differently within the model and yield different weights to
and from the influencing factors.
When the natural tendencies for these elements are observed independently, it can
be seen that they exhibit an initial exponential growth period and a finite level that is
bounded by resources or other environmental constraints. Initially, the growth would be
more subtle; as economic development is set in motion or the local government matures.
This initial stage is followed by a period of greater expansion when the forces that act
within each of these elements become more efficient and capable. Finally the transition
to their steady state again occurs gradually. At this point services are established at
required levels and economic independence is solidified. These characteristics make up
the S-Shaped behavior that is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural Behavior of S-Shaped
Structure.

Finally, Information Operations, Resentment, and Coalition Investment do not
demonstrate independent natural behavior. These elements all seem to share
characteristics that would suggest they are 1st Order Draining structures, but because
those drains are only apparent when they are influenced by other elements, then the
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requirements for assigning a natural behavior are not met. Nonetheless, the elements
continue to be important aspects of the counterinsurgency system and their lack of
independent behavioral characteristics does not diminish the weight of their
contributions.
Through the development of an initial System Dynamics model, Baker (2006)
suggested that poor intelligence was a contributing factor in negating the efforts that
security and the rule of law could provide for the counterinsurgency. This study
broadens the reach of Information Operations to not only include intelligence, but an
integrated use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological
operations, military deception, and operations security (JP 3-13, 2006). FM 3-24 (2006)
emphasizes the need for effective Information Operations to broadcast government and
counterinsurgent actions and successes in an effort to counteract insurgent propaganda.
Second, Resentment is a key component of the model that describes the sentiments of the
population towards foreign combat forces. These feelings stem from perceptions of
indiscriminate military action, excess collateral damage, or just the presence of an
occupying force. Finally, Coalition Investment is the element that considers all of the
resources from the allies that supports the local government’s fight against the
insurgency. All of these elements, even though distinct and independent in the context of
their influences, share their structural tendency to drain information, feelings of
resentment, or resources once they are acted upon from other influences of the model. If
a population begins with a high level of Resentment, for example, then only the
interjection of information pertaining to the merits of the local government and
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contributions of the coalition will deplete their position towards having no ill feelings at
all.

Influence Diagrams of the Hearts and Minds Model
Individually, all of the independent influence structures of each element arising from
each reference mode behavior pattern form the building blocks of the complete model’s
influence diagram. Here the model influences are identified and their relative influence
directions determined. Initially, the blank canvas of the influence diagram, as shown in
Figure 10, is nothing more than the collection of each independent influence structure of
the elements that make up their natural behaviors.

Figure 10: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing independent influence
structures of individual elements.
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The first collection of influences that are identified and depicted in the diagram are those
affecting Popular Support. Most of the elements are affected directly by Popular
Support and, in turn, provide feedback in the form of a Reinforcing Loop. In the example
of Host Nation Security Forces, Popular Support will work to diminish the loss of Host
Nation Security Forces through increasing recruiting and lowering attrition. When this
losing factor is acted upon in a negative fashion by Popular Support, the result is an
increase in the net level of Host Nation Security Forces. This increased level of local
military and law enforcement increases the Popular Support for the Host Nation by
providing the populace with a stable and secure environment that directly reflects the
government’s policies and actions. The loop will continue its reinforcing nature. Similar
arguments suggest the same reinforcing nature also exists for the elements of
Governance, Essential Services, and Host Nation Economy. These influences are shown
in Figure 11. As a matter of notation and in order to simplify the final influence diagram,
the flows that cause gains or reductions to the element’s stocks have not been showed.
But it is important to understand that it is these flow structures that manage the
magnitude and direction of the influences and that they must be present and effectively
described during the development of the flow diagram.
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Figure 11: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing influences of Popular
Support with Host Nation Security Forces, Essential Services, Host Nation Economy, and
Governance.

The influence of Popular Support on Resentment is similar to the previous elements. In
this case the feedback from Resentment flows back directly into decreasing Popular
Support and is also indirectly seen through Resentment’s influence on Host Nation
Security Forces. In this case, an increase in Popular Support would directly result in a
decrease in the Resentment felt by the populace because of their gains in confidence in
the Host Nation. For the direct influence, this results in a gain in Popular Support and a
reinforcing loop. In the case of the indirect influence, reduced Resentment causes a direct
reduction in the losses of Host Nation Security Forces. Like before, the losses are
attributed to recruiting and retention of security personnel; positive gains in Resentment
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would decrease recruiting and retention efforts, whereas lower feelings of Resentment
increase these trends. Again, as seen before, these factors then cause increases to the
levels of Host Nation Security Forces and, subsequently, increases to Popular Support.
The other influences that are present with Popular Support are those affecting
Information Operations and Coalition Investment. In both of these cases Popular
Support serves as an input to their dynamics and only feeds back into Popular Support
through aggregated or obscure mediators. In the case of Information Operations,
Popular Support serves as a source of intelligence, particularly Human Intelligence (or
HUMINT), that can be exploited for use with kinetic operations and to survey the
effectiveness of local government and coalition policies. But, unlike in the previous
examples, it is not logical to suppose that Information Operations themselves affect
Popular Support. Some may say that propaganda of coalition and government policies
and actions would directly affect Popular Support. But, in fact, this feedback occurs
through various mediating factors such as an increase in the Perception of Good
Governance and through a reduction in Feelings of Resentment. More on the influences
of Information Operations will be discussed further in this section.
Finally, Popular Support also directly affects the level of Coalition Investment
that is being allocated to the counterinsurgency. Unlike for the case of Information
Operations, here Popular Support acts as a drain on the level of Coalition Investment.
Popular Support is seen as a metric for which the coalition judges the success of the
counterinsurgency; as Popular Support rises, then the coalition can begin withdrawing its
efforts and its investment.

44

The effects of Popular Support on all of the elements discussed up to this point
are shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of
Popular Support.
The next influence element that will be connected to the model will be Resentment.
Resentment, like the other elements that have a Draining reference mode, will simply
dissipate if left alone. But, when placed in the context of the counterinsurgency system,
it will react to the influences within the system. In the case of Resentment, it is the
presence of Coalition Combat Operations that supplies the building of these feelings by
the populace. The reinforcing feedback caused by this influence is channeled back
through Resentment’s control over Host Nation Security Forces, which is in an
Oscillating structure with Coalition Combat Operations. The other influence that is
present with Feelings of Resentment is a direct negative relationship with Perception of
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Good Governance. As these feelings continue to grow because of the presence of foreign
troops and their conduct of military operations, then the populace will lose faith in the
reach of the local government. It is true that these feelings can be mitigated and that
influence will be discussed further in this section. The influences of Resentment on the
system components are depicted in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of
Resentment.

Now the influences pertaining to Information Operations can be described and added to
the model. Here two reinforcing loops are present, caused by the Host Nation Economy
and Governance. Both of these elements offer ammunition to Information Operations in
the form of media coverage of government events and the state of the economy. They
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also both receive feedback from Information Operations to reinforce their growth; when
investors, for the example of the Host Nation Economy, are introduced to positive news
about the economic conditions, then they are more likely to invest further. Similarly,
Essential Services feed the stock of Information Operations with positive media
coverage, but does not receive the same feedback influence; positive news of previous
successes will not alter the plans for developing these services, they will be managed
based on the needs of the population. Information Operations also play a role in
diminishing the Feelings of Resentment that is caused by the presence of coalition forces.
Greater sources of information reduce the likelihood of collateral damage, unnecessary
raids, or targeting innocents that are suspected of cooperating with the insurgents.
Information Operations also reduce the anxiety that the public can feel during the
insurgency by reinforcing the position of the government and the actions that the local
leaders and the coalition have taken to improve the infrastructure and economy. The
influences of Information Operations, which are shown in Figure 14, have been found to
be of great importance to the system because of their reach and diversity and will be
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter and during the findings of the study.
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Figure 14: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model showing the influences of
Information Operations.

The final elements that will be connected are those that are supplied by Coalition
Investment. It is assumed that an external coalition will support the local government
against the insurgency not only with military, economic, and political support, but also
with resources. These resources take the form of financial support, personnel, equipment,
and logistics and are required for starting all of the coalition counterinsurgency elements:
Coalition Combat Operations, Information Operations, Essential Services, and Economic
Development. These influences also introduce very necessary Compensating Loops into
the system. These loops work to stabilize the reinforcing influences that have dominated
the environment to this point. The compensating nature effectively reduces the Host
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Nation’s dependency on the coalition as conditions improve. For this to work, the
government then needs to take over these resources once the coalition has begun to
withdraw. Thus, influences from Governance to these elements, in this case Host Nation
Security Forces, Economic Development, and Essential Services, emerge.
The complete depiction of the influence diagram that describes the Hearts and
Minds counterinsurgency model is shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Influence Diagram of Hearts and Minds model.

Flow Diagrams of the Hearts and Minds Model
The process of operationalizing the influence diagram through simulation is done with
the aid of System Dynamics software. STELLA® (version 9.0.2, by ISEE, Inc) is used

49

for this study because of its widespread acceptance among System Dynamics proponents.
The following section will detail the process that converts the logical development of
system influences into graphical representations of system behavior.
The first step in establishing the framework for developing the flow diagram is to
establish the general requirements for the model simulation. First the length and time
interval of the simulation is determined. Following past examples of
counterinsurgencies, we have seen that the conflict in Algeria lasted eight years, and the
Malayan Emergency, the conflict that gave birth to the concept of Heart and Minds, had a
duration of 12 years (O’Neill, 2001). Recently, Nagl (2008) suggested that the average
counterinsurgency campaign is approximately 10 years. These estimates provide a
starting point for establishing the length of the simulation. In an effort to keep the
modeling and simulation as uncomplicated as practical, a length of 10 years is selected;
which will be expressed in terms of months, thus giving the simulation a range from zero
to 120 months. As explained before, the exact timescale of a month is not important for
this type of complex social model and the interpretation must not focus on relative
behavior over the course of one or two months, but in terms of short-, medium-, and
long-term horizons.
The modeling can now proceed to translating the individual reference mode
influence diagrams into flow diagrams and then incrementally connecting the elements in
the same manner as the influence diagram that was previously developed. The goal is to
initially establish the range of values of coefficients that operationalize each of the
elements so that they mirror the natural behavior and can continue to exert he same level
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of influence as other system influences come to bear on the elements. It is apparent that
the initial step of establishing the individual flow diagrams and connecting them
incrementally is critical to the usefulness and validity of the model.
As with the case of the natural behaviors and the influence diagrams, the flow
diagram development process will begin with Popular Support. Popular Support, on an
individual basis, can exist as being achieved by one side or another, or can also take the
form of a neutral or passive support (FM 3-24, 2006). But, simulating behavior at the
level of individual members of a population and attempting to judge their perception as to
falling in one of three categories of support would lead to far more detail than this study
requires. In an effort to take a more elevated view of the system and maintain an
adequate level of aggregation, a convention of positive and negative support will be
adopted. When Popular Support is positive, the support resides with the
counterinsurgents and the local government; a negative value of Popular Support
indicates strengthening on the insurgent’s part. And, as observed from the natural
behavior, if none of the forces are acting to a greater degree than the other, then Popular
Support will tend towards neutrality. The flow diagram and the graphical output of
Popular Support’s natural behavior are shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Popular Support element
in the Hearts and Minds model.

The next elements that will be studied via the flow diagramming process are Coalition
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces. This reference mode is more
complex than the simple Draining Structure seen for Popular Support, Coalition
Investment, Information Operations, and Resentment. Also, the boundaries of these
behaviors require a different approach as seen before; Popular Support arbitrarily started
at 100 (or -100) and was only required to dissipate to zero. In this case the maximum
spike and the steady state values of forces are of importance. Following the most recent
example of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the maximum number of coalition military forces
was 164,000 (Baker & Hamilton, 2006), which would, according to estimates of initial
planning metrics, be maintained at a level of 30,000 to 40,000 (Global Security, 2008).
The Iraqi Security Forces numbered at it greatest level at approximately 300,000 (Baker
& Hamilton, 2006) and would finish with an end-state value of approximately 137,000
(DoD, 2006). These values only provide a reference from which to begin the modeling
process and should not be interpreted as exact or required for the model to be valid.
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The flow diagram and the graphical output of the natural behavior of Coalition
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces are shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Combat
Operations and Host Nation Security Forces elements in the Hearts and Minds model.

The graphical representation of the natural behavior of these elements does have one
characteristic that should be discussed. The level of Coalition Combat Operations begins
to steadily increase and reaches its maximum value of approximately 160 (representing
thousands of coalition troops). Then, as expected, the level of Host Nation Security
Forces continues to increase and the level of coalition support now decreases
proportionally. Then a low of zero is reached by the level of Coalition Combat
Operations, before it then begins to rise again in response to the diminished value of Host
Nation Security Forces. This does not imply that after the initial surge the coalition
should remove its troops, only to bring them back several months later. The dampened
oscillation that is observed from the structure is a function of the boundary values and
steady state objective of the structure and serves to represent physical constraints of the
elemental stocks. In a standard oscillating structure, one that is not dampened by the
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physical constraints of the model, the pure oscillation would maintain a slightly different
characteristic behavior. But the requirements of this particular model, in this case the
addition of the Host Nation Security Forces Compounding Factor which represents the
local forces ability to train their own once they are established, is necessary for the
model’s development and an addition to the standard structure.
The final set of reference modes that will be operationalized into a flow diagram
are the S-Shaped structures of Governance, Essential Services, and Host Nation
Economy. Since these factor have such variability across regions and time, it would be
impractical to estimate values for these elements that would relate to actual examples or
events. The important aspect of developing these flow diagrams is to obtain an
acceptable reference mode behavior and not a designated set of values. Thus, for all of
these elements a standard steady state value of 100 was selected as the maximum and the
value will be achieved at approximately the half way point in the simulation; 60 months
for this model.
The flow diagram and the graphical output of Essential Services’ natural behavior
are shown in Figure 18. The flow diagram and graph of Host Nation Economy are not
shown because they are identical to those of Essential Services. The flow diagram and
the graphical output of Governance’s natural behavior are shown in Figure 19.
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Figure 18: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Essential
Services element in the Hearts and Minds model.

Figure 19: Flow Diagram and graph of emergent behavior of Governance element in the
Hearts and Minds model.

The next step in the process of developing the Hearts and Minds model is to begin to
incrementally combine the individual flow diagrams that depict each of the elemental
reference modes. Only when anomalous behavior patterns are spotted, should the
previously established coefficient values and modeling parameters be changed. This
ensures that the model is not altered during the modeling process to fulfill a previously
derived conclusion.
The following process will only demonstrate key examples or unusual modeling
circumstances because of the numerous steps in the procedure. For example, in order to
connect Popular Support to Host Nation Security Forces through the previously
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established influence, the modeler must first connect the stock of Popular Support to the
flow of Losing HN Security Forces through the HN Security Forces Draining Factor.
The emergent behavior is then observed and compared to the expected pattern. In this
case, it is expected that an increased level of Popular Support would decrease the losses
associated with Host Nation Security Forces and would cause this element to peak at a
higher maximum and reach a higher steady state value. If this behavior is seen, as it was
with this case, then the connection is removed and the complementing influence is tested.
Now the level of Host Nation Security Forces will add to the stock of Popular Support.
The emergent behavior, both the anticipated and the observed after making this
connection, shows that Popular Support does not drain completely to zero. Finally both
connections are made and the behavior of the new flow diagram is observed. In this case
the level of Popular Support drops initially, but maintains a higher level than without the
influence of Host Nation Security Forces. For their part, the level of Host Nation
Security Forces is maintained at a slightly higher level thanks to the decrease in loss
associated with Popular Support’s influence. The flow diagram showing the influence
feedback between these two elements is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Flow Diagram of interaction between the Popular Support element and the
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces elements in the Hearts
and Minds model.

Continuing to incrementally add the remaining influence elements into the Hearts and
Minds model yields the completed version of the flow diagram (Figure 21). Also, Table
3 summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients that have been described
during the construction of this flow diagram.
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Figure 21: Flow Diagram of Hearts and Minds model.
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Table 3: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Hearts
and Minds model Flow Diagram.
Coefficient Name
Popular Support Flow Factor
Coalition Combat Support Compounding
Factor

Coefficient Value
0.1
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to
Security

Coalition Combat Support Draining
Factor
HN Security Forces Compounding Factor
HN Security Forces Draining Factor
Services Compounding Factor
Services Draining Factor
Economic Development Compounding
Factor
Economic Development Draining Factor
Governance Compounding Factor
Governance Draining Factor
Services Factor
HN Security Level Factor
Economic Factor
Governance Factor
Support Resentment Factor
Security Resentment Factor
Security Governance Factor
Services Governance Factor
Services Support Factor
Econ Gov Factor

Econ Info Ops Factor
Economy Support Factor
Governance Resentment Factor
Governance Info Ops Factor
Resentment Factor
Resentment Info Factor

0.19
0.005
x = HN Security Forces
0.0033
0
0.00062
0
x = HN Security Forces
0.0001
x = Essential Services
0.05
0.0001
x = Host Nation Economy
0.05
0.001
x = Perception of Good Governance
0.05
0.067
x = Essential Services
0.05
x = HN Security Forces
0.067
x = Host Nation Economy
0.067
x = Perception of Good Governance
0.25
0.1
0.025
0.05
0.1
0.05
0.5
10
0.005
0.05
10
x = Perception of Good Governance
10
0.15
1.0
0.5
10
x = Information Operations
0.1
x = Popular Support
0.0075
0.15
1.0
10
0.5
10
x = Information Operations
0.16
6
x = Coalition Combat Operations
0.1
x = Information Operations

Support Coalition Investment Factor

0.003

Coalition Combat Operations/month
Coalition Combat Operations/(HN Security
Forces*month)
HN Security Forces /(Coalition Combat
Operation*month)
1/month
1/month
1/month
1/month
1/month
1/month
1/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
1/month
HN Security Forces/(Resentment*month)
HN Security/(Governance*month)
Services/(Governance*month)
Services/(Popular Support*month)
Economic Development/month

Economic Development/month
Economic Development/month
Governance/(Resentment*month)
Governance/month
Resentment/month
Resentment/month
Coalition Investment/(Popular
Support*month)

0.2

Info Ops Services Factor

Info Ops Economy Factor
Info Ops Support Factor
Info Ops Governance Factor

0.1
10
0.1
10
x = Essential Services
10
0.4
0.15
0.25
10
x = Host Nation Economy
0.004
x = Popular Support
0.4
0.15
10
0.25
10
x = Perception of Good Governance

Coefficient Units
1/month
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Information Operations/month

Information Operations/month
Information Operations/month
Information Operations/month

Results and Discussion of Hearts and Minds Model Simulation
The flow diagram presented in Figure 21 demonstrates the relevant influences that,
according to the historical review of the theory’s development and applications, are
crucial in defining the Hearts and Minds counterinsurgency strategy. During the
development of the model, several key factors have begun to emerge as important to the
discussion of this theory. First, the influence diagram and the flow diagram both
demonstrate the strength of the influence of Information Operations on the system;
Popular Support, the predominant element in the system and the measure of greatest
importance, is the only other element to have as many influences external to its natural
behavior.
This finding suggests that Information Operations may merit equal ranking in
terms of resource allocation towards the counterinsurgency campaign. While historical
attention has been given to the division of resources between the military and political
components, such as Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964), the value of information superiority
and exploitation now introduces an entirely different approach to this debate. Even
recent discussion on Hearts and Minds theory has allocated very little attention (or even
none at all) to the influences of Information Operations.
Nagl (2002), Long (2006), and Kahl (2007) provide excellent discussions on the
origins and implications of Hearts and Minds. Yet, none of them mention Information
Operations or the need for controlling or managing information as a part of the strategy.
Kilcullen (2008) is more eager to mention the necessity of bolstering information assets
in successful counterinsurgency efforts, but falls short of making substantial arguments as
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to the validity of his suggestions or recommendations for the relative importance of
Information Operations when compared to the traditional counterinsurgency tools. The
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006), on the other hand, is probably the best
proponent of the use of information as a key role in its strategy. FM 3-24 details its
Logical Lines of Operations as being encompassed around wide ranging information
exploitation. Other recent proponents of Information Operations are those that view this
factor from a technological stand point. Even though Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance conducted by air and space platforms are indispensable assets in modern
warfare, counterinsurgency included, (Dunlap, 2007) this is only a portion of the total
Information Operations arsenal. A discussion on the importance of information to
counterinsurgency must be inclusive of its technical (Signal’s Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance) and non-technical (Human Intelligence and Psychological
Operations) aspects. The construction of this model, and subsequent exploration of its
emergent behavior patterns, will add greatly to this debate.
The Hearts and Minds model is constructed in such a manner that the emergent
behavior patterns of all of its elements can be explored under a variety of situations.
First, the model was designed to allow the researcher to manipulate the amount of
Coalition Investment that is allocated to each of the counterinsurgency resources it feeds:
Coalition Combat Operations, Essential Services, Host Nation Economy, and Information
Operations. This feature provides this model with the flexibility to study the variability
of the strategy’s success by altering the combination of resources and observing the
behavior of key indicators, such as the behavior of Popular Support, Resentment, or
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Governance. The model is also capable of adjusting the rate at which Coalition
Investment responds to a shift in Popular Support. With this, the model is able to provide
guidance to policy makers as to how quickly the coalition can transition authority to the
local government without facing unacceptable risk to the mission. This Hearts and Minds
model can also phase operations that could shift the mix of resources to other elements
during different stages of the timeline. This would allow decision makers to model
various approaches that focus on different areas, such as focusing on security during the
short-term and then shifting their efforts to developing essential services and the
economy in later stages. The following section will explore several of these situations in
order to demonstrate the validity and flexibility of the simulation. However, it is not the
intention of this research to explore all of the possible alternatives of this theory or
determine optimal operating conditions. Further research will be recommended in
Chapter 5 that further reinforces the findings of the models developed during this study.
During the model’s construction, one of the design factors used to develop and
test model influences and interactions was the determination of the starting value of
Coalition Investment. Like all elements, Coalition Investment is expressed in terms of
some unit of measure; time, number of people, and amount of dollars are all common.
For this case the amount of Coalition Investment is not as important as the relative
allocation of the resources. Thus, the stock in question is designated as having an initial
value of 100 with a percentage unit of measure assigned. In this manner distribution of
resources can be simply quantified as a portion of 100 percent. Initially the logical
development of the model suggested that equally distributing Coalition Investment
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among the four elements it drives (Coalition Combat Operations, Information
Operations, Essential Services, and Host Nation Economy) would provide an adequate
starting point for observing the model’s behavior. This baseline emergent behavior plot
is shown in Figure 22.
The plots depicted in Figure 22 through Figure 26 show the behavior patterns of
the main indicators of the Hearts and Minds model: (1) Popular Support, (2) Coalition
Investment, (3) Resentment, (4) Coalition Combat Operations, and (5) Host Nation
Security Forces. The plot is scaled for a range of values from zero to 300 for Popular
Support, Coalition Combat Operations, and Host Nation Security Forces and from zero
to 100 for Coalition Investment and Resentment. These ranges of values are designed to
provide the greatest appreciation for the detail of the behavior patterns and may be
changed in order to appreciate behavioral details.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment
(3) Feelings of Resentment
(4) Coalition Combat Operations
(5) Host Nation Security Forces

Figure 22: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds model given even allocation of
Coalition Investment to Security, Economy, Services, and Information Operations.
Figure 22 provides great insight and a positive outlook into the viability of the Hearts and
Minds model. The first indicator, Popular Support, was designed to maintain positive
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values for situations in which the support was given to the local government and that the
magnitude of these values would determine their relative support. Here, Popular Support
begins to drop during the initial stages of the campaign, but this level does not drop into
negative values. The initial decline of Popular Support is attributed to the heightened
Feelings of Resentment that begin to spike during this time. Since the short-term phase
introduces many coalition troops which will cause an increase in Resentment and
Information Operations have not had time to fully develop, then this reaction by the
population is normal and expected. In the later stages of the counterinsurgency, as troop
levels decrease because of added security, development of critical infrastructure and the
economy, and a growing information campaign, then Resentment begins to diminish until
it no longer influences the system and Popular Support is able to stabilize at a relatively
high and steady level. Throughout this entire time, Coalition Investment has reacted to
the level of Popular Support; initially dropping gradually with the positive support trend
and decreasing more rapidly as Popular Support reaches its positive, stable value.
Equally distributing Coalition Investment among the four elements provides an
excellent baseline from which to evaluate other combinations of resources. With this
model, policy makers can test different scenarios that focus resources on one or more
elements, providing great insight into the complexities of the Hearts and Minds strategy.
The first of these scenarios that will be considered is the one proposed by Galula (1964).
The French counterinsurgent suggested that fighting an insurgency was 20 percent
military and 80 percent political. To test this theory the model was adjusted to provide
the Coalition Combat Operation’s element with 20 percent of the coalition’s resource,
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while the remaining 80 percent will be divided equally among the remaining factors. The
plot demonstrating this behavior is shown in Figure 23.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment
(3) Feelings of Resentment
(4) Coalition Combat Operations
(5) Host Nation Security Forces

Figure 23: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds model given allocation of Coalition
Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to Security and 80% equally to
Economy, Services, and Information Operations.

The behavior shown in Figure 23 depicting Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) has several key
distinctions compared to the baseline behavior model. First, Popular Support seems to
stabilize much quicker, but at a cost of not reaching the same level as before. In many
ways this scenario proves to be more beneficial because the level of Popular Support is
still maintained in the positive region throughout the simulation, but the lack of
turbulence during the initial stages allows planners to reduce Coalition Investment at a
greater rate earlier in the timeline. The implication of providing less resources to the
combat aspects, 20 percent instead of 25 percent, allows initial foreign troop levels to
stay lower and not cause the spikes in Resentment that were seen before. The simulation
suggests that effective training of Host Nation Security Forces would be more successful
than employing large quantities of coalition troops towards security operations. One way
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to support this finding is to adjust the model once again and, this time, focus the
coalition’s resources on Coalition Combat Operations; thus testing the opposed theory.
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25. Figure 24
demonstrates the model’s behavior according to the newly adjusted parameters on the
same scale that has been used in the previous examples. In order to view the relative
behaviors more clearly, Figure 25 expands the viewing range of the plot’s scale.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment
(3) Feelings of Resentment
(4) Coalition Combat Operations
(5) Host Nation Security Forces

Figure 24: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition
Investment following Combat Operations-focused strategy: 55% to Security and 45%
equally to Economy, Services, and Information Operations.
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(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment
(3) Feelings of Resentment
(4) Coalition Combat Operations
(5) Host Nation Security Forces

Figure 25: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition
Investment following Combat Operations-focused strategy: 55% to Security and 45%
equally to Economy, Services, and Information Operations. The plot has been re-scaled
from standard view in order to observe behavior patterns.

These two figures demonstrate the dangers of allocating too many resources towards
combat operations because of the high risk of increasing Feelings of Resentment to such a
point that Popular Support shifts to levels that cannot be regained.
The final comparison that will be made at this stage of the research will be to
explore the initial intuition regarding the importance of Information Operations. Due to
its reach of influence with the greatest number of the model elements, it is expected that
not granting this factor the adequate amount of recourses would be detrimental to the
counterinsurgency. This assumption is confirmed by the behavior shown in Figure 26.
This figure has also been scaled to allow the observer to appreciate the behavior of the
model’s elements beyond the original plotted scale.
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(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Investment
(3) Feelings of Resentment
(4) Coalition Combat Operations
(5) Host Nation Security Forces

Figure 26: Emergent Behavior of Hearts and Minds given allocation of Coalition
Investment following strategy that does not consider Information Operations: 0% to
Information Operations and 100% equally to Security, Economy, and Services. The plot
has been re-scaled from standard view in order to observe behavior patterns.

The behavior in Figure 25 can be attributed to the growth of Resentment and the
counterinsurgent’s attempt to employ more Coalition Combat Operations to increase
Popular Support; which reinforced the downward spiral of Resentment and negative
support. But, that same trend is not apparent in Figure 26. Even though Resentment
grows, it only reaches approximately half the maximum level over the same timeline.
Thus, it can be concluded that the elimination of Information Operations (the only drain
on Resentment other than its loss due to increased Popular Support) causes the system to
not react as negatively to the continued Coalition Investment in security, infrastructure,
and the economy.
The insight gained from the development of the Hearts and Minds model provides
a necessary first step in exploring the requirements of today’s military planners. But, this
theory, and the model that describes it, fails to address some key aspects that have lead to
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its criticism by military officials and scholars alike. The other counterinsurgency theory
that will be evaluated is the Cost Benefit Theory.

Reference Modes and Natural Behaviors of the Cost Benefit Theory Model
Developed during the Vietnam conflict, Cost Benefit Theory focuses its strategy around
the quantifiable objectives of Insurgent Activities and Insurgent Organizational
Mechanisms. With these factors being the targets of the counterinsurgency, then the
Population’s Behavior, and not its feelings like in Hearts and Minds, serves as the
indicator of the counterinsurgency effectiveness (Leites & Wolf, 1970). In this case
Population Behavior is the action that the population takes in favor of the host
government; voting in the elections, respecting the rule or law, and paying taxes are
examples of this measure. While similar to Popular Support from the Hearts and Minds
model, Population Behavior accounts for the measurable acts of the locals and not their
general attitudes towards the government. Also, like Popular Support, Population
Behavior exhibits a Draining structure as its natural behavior. As before, the elements of
the Cost benefit Theory model as well as their natural behavior are summarized in Table
4.
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Table 4: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Cost Benefit Theory model.
Model Element
Population Behavior
Coalition Combat Operations
Host Nation Capacity
Insurgent Activities
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms
Coalition Investment
Information Operations
Internal Resources
External Resources

Reference Mode
1st Order Draining
S‐Shaped
S‐Shaped
Stock Adjustment – Approach to Steady
State
No Natural Behavior
No Natural behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior

Insurgent Activities encompasses all of the actions that the insurgency takes in order to
meet its military and political objectives. These activities are not limited to acts of
violence alone, but also consist of anti-government propaganda, recruiting, and attempts
at exerting religious or social influence over the population. When observing these
activities, the natural behavior of this element can be seen as a rapid increase from the
beginning that tapers off to a level state once objectives are reached or they are limited by
the available resources. The quick initial increase in activities can be seen in historic
examples where a large event or a series of incidents trigger the start of the insurgency,
rather than a slow progression towards revolt. (O’Neill, 2001) This behavior may seem
to mimic an S-Shaped Structure, but since the initial increase is rapid rather than gradual,
then the behavior is categorized as a Stock Adjustment Structure (or an Approach to
Steady State Structure). An example of this pattern can be seen in Figure 27.
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Figure 27: Reference Mode Diagram and graph of Natural behavior of Approach to
Steady State Structure.

In order to accomplish these activities, the insurgency needs strong organization.
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms represent the insurgency’s leadership, military,
recruiting, and propaganda structures (Leites & Wolf, 1970). This element is structurally
unique in that it does not experience a natural behavior. It is not logical to attempt to
observe this element outside of the context of the system as a whole and thus its natural
tendencies cannot be hypothesized. This type of model element is not uncommon, but, in
general terms, it is more desirable for the modeler to make every attempt to attribute a
natural behavior to the prominent stocks. Other elements in this model that also do not
have natural behaviors that could be determined are the Internal and External Resources,
Information Operations and Coalition Investment; which will be discussed further in this
section.
By challenging the organizational and active elements through Coalition Combat
Operations and Information Operations, the coalition and local government seek to
disrupt the insurgency’s ability to conduct activities and negatively affect the population.
Even though these elements are shared with Hearts and Minds, this philosophical
difference in their influence directly contrasts the logic used to develop the Hearts and
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Minds model; while Hearts and Minds employed security, information, and the local
government to boost Popular Support, Cost Benefit Theory directly seeks to disrupt
insurgent structures and reduce their capacity to conduct operations (Peters, 2006). The
Coalition Combat Operations element, as opposed to its representation in Hearts and
Minds, includes the forces that are also provided by the host nation and thus does not
exist in the same structure as the previous model. Here the element behaves as a resource
that begins gradually as forces are built up and reaches a maximum level as defined by
the available resources. This behavior aligns with the classic S-Shaped Structure seen
before. As opposed to those behaviors, the construction of this structure has a subtle
difference. Other elements that have an S-Shaped behavior, such as the Host Nation
Capacity element in this model, manager their growth by limiting its ability for continued
growth based on their resources. In the case of Coalition Combat Operations, the growth
is a function of the requirement to continue targeting the insurgency and is adjusted by a
decreased need for additional combat support. These subtle differences can be seen in
their natural influence diagrams shown in Figure 28 and their natural behavior is SShaped as seen in Figure 9.

Figure 28: Reference Mode Diagrams of S-shaped Structures.

72

Leites and Wolf (1970) identify several other key components that distinguished Cost
Benefit Theory from the previous strategy. This involves their emphasis on the
importance of targeting the resources used by the insurgency. They believed that if the
cost in obtaining resources, both internal and external, were forced to be higher than their
expected benefit, then the insurgency would not be successful. The elements, Internal
Resources and External Resources, are added to the model in order to account for this
component of the theory. It is important to note that the elements have been chosen to
remain separate because of their distinction in availability and their ability to be disrupted
by the coalition. Internal Resources are more available to the insurgency, but they can
also be limited by increased security and information. External Resources are more
scarce, but cannot be cut off by the coalition; hence their distinction as being external to
the system. These external resources become more prominent as technology, more
specifically information technology, expand the reaches of the insurgency’s efforts
beyond the borders of the conflict.
With the natural behaviors identified and the associated influence diagrams of all
of the theory’s elements constructed, the process now focuses on developing the
comprehensive influence diagram.

Influence Diagrams of the Cost Benefit Theory Model
The reference mode diagrams developed in the previous section are the first step in
identifying the individual influences and building the influence diagram. These
individual diagrams can be seen in Figure 29.
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Figure 29: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing the independent
influence structures of individual elements.

The first influence element that will be considered is the Insurgent’s Organizational
Mechanism. This factor is primarily responsible for organizing and directing Insurgent
Activities. Thus, a direct, positive influence can be traced from the insurgent’s leadership
to their ability to conduct operations. During the development of this model it is
noteworthy that most of the feedback influences that generate reinforcing or
compensating behavioral loops are mediated through other elements; this is an example
of this observation. As Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms increase, then more
Insurgent Activities can be managed. This causes a drop in Population Behavior

74

supportive of the local government. As this behavior tends away from the government,
the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms, which rely on a population being susceptible
to recruiting and propaganda, will further be reinforced. This Reinforcing Loop and the
influences that work to increase (Internal Resources and External Resources) or decrease
(Coalition Combat Operations and Information Operations) Insurgent Organizational
Mechanisms are shown in Figure 30.

Figure 30: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms.
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Next, the influences added by Insurgent Activities will be identified and
incorporated into the influence diagram. This element possesses two opportunities for
reinforcing behavior. First, as insurgent operations rise, they work to increase the
availability of Internal Resources. These are critical to improving organization and, as a
result, further escalate Insurgent Activities. The next Reinforcing Loop that is formed by
Insurgent Activities comes from its effect on Host Nation Capacity. The insurgency
directly attacks the local government’s ability to govern, which causes a reduction in the
Population’s Behavior in Favor of the Host Nation and further increases in the
insurgency’s organizational structures and operational capability. Finally, Insurgent
Activities are dampened by the intervention of Coalition Combat Operations. Security
support is fed by the increased level of Insurgent Activities. The coalition responds by
targeting the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms, and the availability of resources,
which balance the insurgent’s unity and capacity to conduct operations. These influences
are shown in the influence diagram in Figure 31.
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Figure 31: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of
Insurgent Activities.

Two more sets of Compensating Loops can now be identified in the influence diagram
and originate from Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity, but they
have very different effects on the system. The first loop is formed by Coalition Combat
Operations and it functions in much the same manner as the previous loop in which this
element was involved. This time the target of the security forces is not the insurgency
directly, but their access to Internal Resources. This influence causes a reduction in
Insurgent Organization Mechanisms and Insurgent Activities, which result in a lower
need for continued combat support. Another element that influences the availability of
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Internal Resources is Host Nation Capacity, which is the other element that generates a
Compensating Loop. In this case, as the local government’s capacity increases the host
nation is able to produce more resources and, as an unintended consequence, make more
resources available to the insurgency. Even though the government also strives to make
sure these resources are distributed appropriately, it is not likely that the total available
resources would increase without a proportionate increase in resources going to the
insurgency. This causes a strengthening in the insurgent’s leadership structure and
activities and a reduction in Host Nation Capacity. These influences are shown in the
diagram in Figure 32.

Figure 32: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model showing influences of
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity.
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Finally, the reinforcing influences of Information Operations, which reinforce the Host
Nation’s Capacity for growth and reduce the availability of Internal Resources, and the
controls of Coalition Investment are added to the model. Like in the previous model,
Coalition Investment is essential to feeding the counterinsurgency assets: Coalition
Combat Operations, Information Operations, and Host Nation Capacity. The element
that guides Coalition Investment and adjusts its overall contribution to the campaign is
Population Behavior. Population Behavior was chosen as the indicator that guides
coalition resources because it provides a more accurate picture of the state of the local
government. The goals of the counterinsurgency are to obtain security and stability in a
country (Nagl, 2002). Population Behavior accounts for actions such as participating in
local elections and sending the children to school. If the security portion of this mission
is not accomplished, then the people will be afraid of being affiliated with the local
government or of letting their children leave their homes. But the opposite is not
necessarily correct. Just because the region is secure, as measured by low Insurgent
Activities, this does not mean that the government is capable of governing its population.
Thus the behavior of the locals is the better indicator that both the security and stability
portions of the counterinsurgency mission have been achieved.
With the addition of the final elements and their effects on the system, the
influence diagram for Cost Benefit Theory is fully developed (Figure 33) and the process
can proceed to building the flow diagram.
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Figure 33: Influence Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model.

Flow Diagrams of the Cost Benefit Theory Model
As before, establishing the flow diagram parameters for this model is the first step in this
phase of the process. In order to maintain standard simulation parameter that will help in
comparing this model to the Hearts and Minds model, the timeline has been maintained
as before. Similarly, all of the factors that establish the model’s behavior will be
determined by using the same procedures.
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The first element that will be developed into the flow diagram is Population
Behavior. As previously discussed, the behavior of this element is very similar to that of
Popular Support from the Hearts and Minds model. The Draining Structure’s behavior is
controlled, as seen before by a flow coefficient, the Pop Behavior Drain Factor. The
behavior pattern and flow diagram for Population Behavior are shown in Figure 34.

Figure 34: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Population Behavior
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model.

The next structure that will be evaluated is the Stock Adjustment Structure of Insurgent
Activities. When this element was developed during the influence diagram phase of the
process, the model was able to capture its behavior and describe it independently of any
other factor. When this model is operationalized, the introduction of the influence from
Insurgent Operational Mechanisms is key; much the same way that Coalition Investment
was introduced into the individual flow diagrams for several factors of the Hearts and
Minds model. In this case, two factors control the rate of growth and maximum value of
the element’s behavior; one for the drain and the other for the gain associated with
Insurgent Operational Mechanisms. The value of both of these factors was determined to
be 0.1. This allows both constraints to meet the standards of simplicity in the
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development and provide the expected behavior, which is shown along with the flow
diagram in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Insurgent Activities
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model.

The other two natural behaviors that will be discussed in this section are those of
Coalition Combat Operations and Host Nation Capacity. As explained before, both of
these elements exhibit the same behavior pattern, S-Shaped Structure, but differ in their
basic construction. One, Coalition Combat Operations, is adjusted by a compensating
force on its draining loop, and the other on its gaining flow. Figure 36 and Figure 37
demonstrate the differences in the construction of these flow diagrams and the similar
behavior patterns of each.

Figure 36: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Combat Support element
in the Cost Benefit Theory model.
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Figure 37: Flow Diagram and graph of emergent behavior of Host Nation Capacity
element in the Cost Benefit Theory model.

The procedure for connecting the individual flow diagrams following the influences
identified in the influence diagram proceeds as with the previous model. The process
incrementally connects the individual elements and compares their emergent behavior to
expected outcomes based on the logic of their influences and the experience of the
modeler. Figure 38 shows the fully developed flow diagram for this model and Table 5
summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients used during the model’s
development.
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Figure 38: Flow Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory model.
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Table 5: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Cost
Benefit Theory model Flow Diagram.
Coefficient Name
Pop Behavior Drain Factor
Combat Support Gaining Factor
Combat Support Compounding Factor
Insurgent Acts Loss Factor
Capacity Compounding Factor
Capacity Draining Factor
Pop Behavior Insurgent Acts Factor
Pop Behavior HN Capacity Factor

Coefficient Value
0.005
0.0002
x = Insurgent Activities
0.0016
x = Combat Support
0.1
0.0004
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.031
0.02
x = Insurgent Activities
0.015
x = Host Nation Capacity

Pop Behavior CI Factor

0.05

Insurgent Acts IOM Factor

0.1

HN Capacity Info Ops Factor
Draining HN Capacity due to Insurgent
Acts Factor
Resource Insurgent Acts Factor
Resource HN Capacity Factor
Resource Combat Support Factor
Resource Info Ops Factor
IOM Info Ops Factor
IOM Pop Behavior Factor
IOM Combat Support Factor
IOM Int Resources Factor
IOM Ext Resources Factor
Info Ops Pop Behavior Factor
Info Ops CI Factor

0.1
x = Information Operations
0.04
1
x = Insurgent Activities
0.015
x = Insurgent Activities
0.01
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.02
x = Combat Support
0.04
x = Information Operations
0.01
x = Information Operations
0.005
x = Population Behavior
0.02
x = Combat Support
0.005
x = Internal Resources
0.005
0.005
x = Population Behavior
0.0225

Coefficient Units
1/month
1/(Coalition Investment*month)
1/month
1/month
1/(Coalition Investment*month)
1/(Insurgent Activities*month)
Population Behavior/month
Population Behavior/month
Coalition Investment/(Population
Behavior/month)
Insurgent Activities/(Insurgent
Organizational Mechanisms*month)
Host Nation Capacity/month
Insurgent Activities
Resources/month
Resources/month
Resources/month
Resources/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms/month
Insurgent Organizational
Mechanisms/(Resources*month)
Information Operations/month
Information Operations/(Coalition
Investment*month)

Results and Discussion of Cost Benefit Theory Model Simulation
At this point, without focusing on the results of the simulation, several observations can
be made from the model’s construction. First, by looking at the number of influences and
their nature, the elements of major importance to this system can be quickly identified:
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Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and Internal and External Resources. Insurgent
Organizational Mechanisms possesses the majority of the influences that are directly tied
to Coalition Investment (Coalition Combat Support and Information Operations). It also
relies on a number of elements to provide fuel for its growth. The fact that this
organizational structure, and not the operations conducted by the insurgency, is the target
of interest in this strategy represents a drastic shift from the mentality of Hearts and
Minds. The previous model did not contain any elements that directly focused on
insurgent force structures or that was guided by their activities; it relied on Popular
Support to be both the target of the coalition and the local government and their indicator
for progress. By focusing on the insurgents directly, in military and political terms, then
a new opportunity for expanding the natural bounds of this system emerges. Another
factor of interest with regard to Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms is its reliance on
Internal and External Resources for continued growth.
The identification of the resources that provide for the insurgency in Cost Benefit
Theory is another aspect that sets it apart from the previous model. While one of the
objectives of increasing the Host Nation’s Capacity is to be able to produce more for the
citizenry, the insight this flow diagram provides allows policy makers to also view these
resources as instrumental to the insurgency. Internal Resources, in particular, are of
interest to the counterinsurgents because of their ability to secure its generation and
control distribution so it is less likely to fall into the hands of the insurgency. As some
have recently stipulated (Long, 2006; Nagl, 2008), a counterinsurgency rests on the
ability to cut off the insurgents from resources across national borders. Thus, the
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External Resources’ contributions, with adequate combat support and improving
technology, could be reduced to the point its effects are negligible when compared to the
overall effects of a single Resource element.
The final comment about the construction of this model is directed to the
generalized element of Host Nation Capacity. This model component is intended to
encompass the local government’s ability to manage the country, much in the same way
that Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms manage the insurgency. The Host Nation
Capacity element, which is fed by Coalition Investment, conducts the governmental,
economic, and infrastructure tasks that are broken out into individual elements in the
Hearts and Minds model. It may then seem logical to question the reasoning behind
Hearts and Minds focus on these elements as individuals rather than dedicating its
resources to the principal of sound governance through a single, measurable stock.
Even though these observations help to provide insight into the system, the
simulation of the model and the information gained from its emergent behaviors solidify
the theory’s contributions. As before, this model is designed to be adjustable to a wide
range of study variables. But, the purpose of this research remains the development of
counterinsurgency strategy from this and the previous model and not the employment of
these models towards test scenarios. The simulations that will be discussed serve the
purpose of testing the model’s effectiveness and validity.
The first graph describing the emergent behavior of the system is shown in Figure
39. This behavior pattern establishes a baseline for comparing the remaining scenarios
and, as before, does not represent current doctrine nor is intended to characterize optimal
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behavior. The graph demonstrates that Population Behavior and Host Nation Capacity
both grow throughout the length of the simulation. As before, positive and growing
behavior is the desired outcome of this model and not a particular value along the scale.
The growth of these elements is attributed to the steady contribution of Coalition
Investment as Population Behavior is still growing and to the heavy contribution of
Combat Support. Structurally this model differs from the development of the Hearts and
Minds model in that the security component is able to complete its objectives (mitigating
insurgent leadership and forces structures) without facing resistance by the people (in the
form of Feelings of Resentment). Since Cost Benefit Theory refuses to allocate resources
to immeasurable indicators, such as Resentment, this model continues to stand as a valid
indicator of the theory’s intentions, but may not be practical in terms of execution
because Hearts and Minds proves to be an excellent justification for accounting for these
emotions.

(1) Population Behavior in favor
of Host Nation
(2) Host Nation Capacity
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment

Figure 39: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory given even allocation of Coalition
Investment to Combat Support, Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations.
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Further understanding of the dynamics of the system comes from observing the behavior
when Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) is simulated. During this simulation of the Hearts
and Minds model, this scenario proved to be an improvement to the equally distributed
allocation of resources. This was due to the adverse effects that are present from the
influence of Resentment on Coalition Combat Operations. In the Cost Benefit Theory
model these effects are not present and thus security plays a much more important role.
It is then expected that reducing the percentage of Coalition Investment allocated to
security from 33 percent to 20 percent will result in a less satisfactory outcome in terms
of the growth or Population Behavior and the reduction of Insurgent Activities. These
effects are demonstrated by the emergent behavior pattern shown in Figure 40.

(1) Population Behavior in favor
of Host Nation
(2) Host Nation Capacity
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment

Figure 40: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory model given allocation of
Coalition Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to Combat Support
and 80% equally distributed to Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations.

Another demonstration of the model’s reaction to shifting resources away from security is
seen by simulating a strategy focused on building Host Nation Capacity. It would be
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logical to assume that since this element is a clear indicator of the strength of the
government, then focusing on this element’s development would yield more positive
results. The problem with this logic again lies with the construction of the model and its
focus on Coalition Combat Operations. When this situation is simulated, the behavior
appears to respond well in the short term; Host Nation Capacity increases dramatically
even though Population Behavior does not respond as rapidly as before. But as the
simulation progresses into the mid- and long-term, the effects of not investing in adequate
security forces becomes apparent as Insurgent Activities rapidly increase and work to
keep Population Behavior low and slowly diminish the efforts of Host Nation Capacity.
This behavior is shown on the plot of Figure 41.

(1) Population Behavior in favor
of Host Nation
(2) Host Nation Capacity
(3) Insurgent Activities
(4) Combat Support
(5) Coalition Investment

Figure 41: Emergent Behavior of Cost Benefit Theory given allocation of Coalition
Investment following Host Nation Capacity-focused strategy: 60% to Host Nation
Capacity and 40% equally to Combat Support, and Information Operations.

The development of this model, along with the information gained from its construction
and simulation, provide a wealth of knowledge that will serve to create a comprehensive
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counterinsurgency strategy model that incorporates the lessons of the two observed
theories. The next sections of this research will explore the elements that will make the
greatest contributions to this Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, the influences that will
dictate its behavior, and the construction of its basic components.

Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy Model
The goal of establishing a Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy based on the lessons from
Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory is to incorporate the most influential elements
and the soundest reasoning from each of the contrasting models in order to gain a better
perspective on the dynamics of this system. In accomplishing this task, the process for
developing the System Dynamics model will proceed in the same manner as with the
previous models. Several steps will not be described in great detail because they will be
repetitive of the tasks that have already been performed; such as determining and
describing the natural behaviors of the elements.
The first step is to determine which elements will meaningfully contribute to the
validity of the model. Since, to this researcher’s knowledge, there is no precedent in the
System Dynamics arena for developing a hybrid structure based on two distinct system
models, this process will be preceded by evaluating several options for completing this
task. One approach that can be considered is to determine which elements fail to
contribute to their model’s dynamics and exclude them from the new environment. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to make a reasonable case for dismissing the effects on any of
the elements from their respective models. Another is to identify similar elements that
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may be interchanged between the models and use these elements as the bridge that
combines the two models. In this case, Popular Support and Population Behavior are
excellent examples of very similar elements that could effectively serve as a link between
the two models. But, if this approach were taken, then other similar elements would
coexist within the same boundary. After considering these options, a subtle modification
to the latter alternative will be implemented for combining these models.
First, similar elements are selected from each of the models and considered for
either direct substitution or aggregation. In the case of Popular Support and Population
Behavior, the exchange can occur directly. For Coalition Combat Operations, the debate
over its transition and combination is complex. Because System Dynamics seeks to
achieve greater levels of aggregation in a model, the choice of accepting the construction
of this element as designed for the Cost Benefit Theory model would appear to be more
desirable. But, the justification that Hearts and Minds advocates provide about the value
of Host Nation Security Forces is far too influential to dismiss. Thus, in this case, the
less aggregated oscillating security element from Hearts and Minds is favored. On the
other hand, the case for aggregation proves to be more formidable when considering
maintaining Host Nation Capacity as a reasonable substitute for the Essential Services,
Host Nation Economy, and Governance components. During the development of the
Hearts and Minds model, these three elements showed identical natural behaviors, very
similar influences, and no noticeable divergence in their emergent behavior patterns when
they were simulated.
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The remaining elements that will form the structure for the new model are the
ones that are common to both systems (Coalition Investment and Information
Operations) and those that were specific to each theory. The relationship between
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and the indicators that drove the Cost Benefit
Theory (Population Behavior and Insurgent Activities) proved to be of unexpected value
to the discussion of counterinsurgency dynamics. Typically Hearts and Minds
proponents stay away from suggesting the importance of directly targeting insurgent
structures because they favor the political and stabilization factors of the strategy. But
their reluctance to grant this factor the value it deserves is not justification enough to
exclude its effectiveness. With this stated, an element identified by the Hearts and Minds
model that balances an overemphasis on military solutions will also be required for
building the combined model. The Resentment element will help mitigate this tendency
by its negative influence on Popular Support when the coalition military level rises to
greater levels. Finally, the last element that will be incorporated into the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy model will be the Resources Available to the Insurgency.
Originally this element was divided into two separate factors; internal and external. But,
as described before, further development of surveillance and information technology and
a focus on border security can negate the proportion of resources that are outside of the
counterinsurgents ability to control and thus it is more reasonable to treat these elements
as a single factor with equal influences. A summary of the elements that have been
discussed are shown with their natural behaviors in Table 6 and as independent
influences structures in Figure 42.
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Table 6: Elements and Natural Behaviors of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.
Model Element
Popular Support
Coalition Combat Operations
Host Nation Security Forces
Host Nation Capacity
Insurgent Activities
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms
Coalition Investment
Information Operations
Resentment
Resources

Reference Mode
1st Order Draining
Oscillation
Oscillation
S‐Shaped
Stock Adjustment – Approach to Steady
State
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior

Figure 42: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing
independent influence structures of individual elements.
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The first influences that will be identified and added to the influence diagram are those of
Popular Support. The Reinforcing Loops that influence Popular Support’s relationships
with Host Nation Security Forces and Resentment are that same as described in the
Hearts and Minds model. Similarly, the influence loops created between Popular
Support and Host Nation Capacity mimics the connections with the Services, Economy,
and Governance element that this factor replaces. Also, there exists another Reinforcing
Loop between Popular Support and Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms that is
mediated through Insurgent Activities. This influence is the same as the one described in
the Cost Benefit Theory model involving Population Behavior. These influences are
shown in Figure 43.

Figure 43: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing
influences of Popular Support.
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The next influences considered are those that relate to Coalition Combat Operations.
This element forms two Compensating Loops with Insurgent Organizational
Mechanisms and Resources and a Reinforcing Loop with Resentment. The
Compensating Loops are both mediated through Insurgent Activities; reducing Insurgent
Organizational Mechanisms and Resources available will work to decrease the amount of
Insurgent Activities and reduce the need for security operations. The Resentment loop is
part of the Popular Support influence loop that affects the level of Host Nation Security
Forces and the coalition’s requirement to train and augment more local forces. These
influences are shown in Figure 44.
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Figure 44: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing
influences of Coalition Combat Operations.

Information Operations, for its part, influences the system by adding four more
Reinforcing Loops that help to bolster the Host Nation Capacity and Popular Support
and attempts to reduce Feelings of Resentment and Resources Available to the
Insurgency. These influences are highlighted in Figure 45.
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Figure 45: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model showing
influences of Information Operations.

The final sources of influence originate from the effects of Coalition Investment and Host
Nation Capacity. Both of these elements generate resources that control the progress of
the counterinsurgency. Coalition Investment, as seen before, feeds the Coalition Combat
Support, Information Operations, and Host Nation Capacity elements. Host Nation
Capacity is responsible for providing resources for conducting training of local military
and law enforcement. This influence is of importance because it indicates that when
Coalition Investment decreases due to rising Popular Support, the training is not
stagnated because of decreased levels of coalition troops. The completed influence
diagram of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model can be seen in Figure 46.
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Figure 46: Influence Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.

These elements are now operationalized into the simulation software, STELLA 9, and
converted into flow diagrams. First, the reference mode diagrams of the individual
elements are modeled independent of the system influences and then incremental
relationships are added and tested until the completed system is developed. Figure 47
through Figure 50 demonstrate the flow diagrams and behavior patterns of the Coalition
Combat Operations and Host Nation Security Forces, Popular Support, Host Nation
Capacity, and Insurgent Activities elements.
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Figure 47: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Coalition Combat
Operations and Host Nation Security Forces element in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency
Strategy model.

Figure 48: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of the Popular Support element
in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.

Figure 49: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of Host Nation Capacity element
in the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.
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Figure 50: Flow Diagram and graph of natural behavior of Insurgent Activities element in
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.

The construction of the flow diagram progresses by incrementally adding the influences
of the individual elements in the same manner as they were identified during the
development of the influence diagram. The complete construction of the flow diagram of
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model depicts all of the influences identified
during the model’s development. This diagram can is shown in Figure 51. Table 7 also
summarizes the names, values, and units of the coefficients that were used to develop the
Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.
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Figure 51: Flow Diagram of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model.
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Table 7: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the development of the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy model Flow Diagram
Coefficient Name
Popular Support Flow Factor
Coalition Combat Support Compounding
Factor
Coalition Combat Support Draining
Factor
HN Security Forces Compounding Factor
HN Security Forces Draining Factor
Capacity Compounding Factor
Capacity Draining Factor
Insurgent Acts Loss Factor
Insurgent Acts IOM Factor
Support Security Factor
Support Capacity Factor
Support Insurgency Factor
Support Resentment Factor
Support Info Ops Factor
HN Security Capacity Factor
Info Ops CI Factor
Info Ops Support Factor
Info Ops Capacity Factor
Support Coalition Investment Factor
Capacity Info Ops Factor
Capacity Support Factor
Capacity Insurgent Act Factor
Resentment Info Ops Factor
Resentment Support Factor
Resentment Security Factor
Resources Combat Ops Factor
Resources Info Ops Factor
Resources Capacity Factor
Resources Insurgent Act Factor
IOM Support Factor
IOM Security Factor
IOM Resources Factor

Coefficient Value
0.1
0.025
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to
Security*Insurgent Activities

0
0

0.1
0.05
x = Host Nation Security Forces
0.05
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.06
1
x = Insurgent Activities
0.06
1
x = Feelings of Resentment
0.05
x = Information Operations
0.05
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.015
x = Percentage Coalition Investment to
Information Operations
0.005
x = Popular Support
0.005
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.002
0.05
x = Information Operations
0.05
x = Popular Support
0.05
x = Insurgent Activities
0.05
x = Information Operations
0.025
x = Popular Support
0.16
6
x = Coalition Combat Operations
0.01
x = Coalition Combat Operations
0.005
x = Information Operations
0.0025
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.01
x = Insurgent Activities
0.025
x = Popular Support
0.005
x = Coalition Combat Operations
0.02
x = Resources

103

Coalition Combat Support/month
Coalition Combat Support/(Host Nation
Security Forces*month)
Host Nation Security Forces/(Coalition
Combat Operations*month)

0.19
0.005
x = Host Nation Security Forces
0.0033
0.0012
x = Popular Support
0.00064
x = Host Nation Capacity
0.049
0.1

Coefficient Units
1/month

1/month
1/(Coalition Investment*month)
1/month
1/month
Insurgent Activities/(Insurgent
Organizational Mechanism*month)
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Popular Support/month
Host Nation Security Forces/month
Information Operations/month
Information Operations/month
Information Operations/month
Coalition Investment/(Popular
Support*month)
Host Nation Capacity/month
Host Nation Capacity/month
Host Nation Capacity/month
Feelings of Resentment/month
Feelings of Resentment/month
Feelings of Resentment/month
Resources/month
Resources/month
Resources/month
Resources/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month
Insurgent Organizational Mechanism/month

Results and Discussion of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy Model Simulation
From the model’s construction it is apparent that the goal of this strategy is to incorporate
all of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency into the most robust definition of
doctrine possible. The combination of elements from Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit
Theory provides a noticeable difference in the model’s structure; more influences exist
among a wider range of elements than in the previous models. This leads to a more
balanced approach to counterinsurgency, where even radical shifts in focus of Coalition
Investment would still be expected to yield similar behaviors. This expectation is
supported by observing the emergent behavior patterns from the model’s simulation. The
first simulation, Figure 52, demonstrates that standard allocation of coalition resources
evenly among Coalition Combat Operations, Host Nation Capacity, and Information
Operations.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity
(5) Insurgent Activities

Figure 52: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy given even
allocation of Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat Operations, Host Nation
Capacity, and Information Operations.
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The plot of emergent behavior suggests promising results for the validity of the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy. The emergent behavior shows that Popular Support, after
undergoing an expected initial decline, began to rise steadily after the initial stages. This
initial decrease is due to the high levels of Coalition Combat Operations that are present
early and the Resentment that results from this initial surge. The heightened focus on
security operations early is critical to the development of two key elements. First, this
initial increase in foreign combat forces jumpstarts the Host Nation Security Forces
training during the short-term phase and allows this local force to take over the security
responsibilities over the mid- and long-term. The other important aspect about the high
initial spike in combat troops is to control the rise of Insurgent Activities by disrupting
Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and cutting off access to Resources. Thus, the
adverse effects of heightened Coalition Combat Operations (in the form of Resentment)
are outweighed by the benefits of increased training and lower insurgent operations. The
other key component that this behavior demonstrates is the steady increase of Host
Nation Capacity due to the balanced allocation of resources by the coalition and the
multiplying effects that this element causes on the system: increasing Popular Support,
Host Nation Security Forces, and the capability of Information Operations.
The next plot demonstrates the simulation of Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964) on the
Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy. The plot of the system’s behavior can be seen in
Figure 53. As described before, it is expected that reasonable changes to the resource
allocation will have minimal effects on the outcome of the emergent behaviors patterns,
even though the overall level of each elements seems to have been slightly reduced. The

105

first plot (Figure 52) allocates 33 percent Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat
Operations and yields a higher initial spike in combat troops and higher long-term level
of Popular Support when compared to Figure 53.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity
(5) Insurgent Activities

Figure 53: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model given
allocation of Coalition Investment following Galula’s 80/20 Theory (1964): 20% to
Combat Support and 80% equally to Host Nation Capacity, and Information Operations.

A very interesting point surfaces from looking at these two plots. The long-standing
assumption presented by Galula suggests that the political component of
counterinsurgency would be more influential than the military element. But the
simulation of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model proposes that this is not the
case during the short-term where subduing the Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and
limiting Insurgent Activities take priority.
The question also remains as to what exactly is a reasonable change in resource
allocation. In the Hearts and Minds model, a study of resource allocation towards
Coalition Combat Operations yielded that any percentage distribution greater the 25
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percent towards security would cause irreversible harm to the level of Popular Support.
But, because of the nature of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, this behavior is not
expected. As explained before, even through Feelings of Resentment are still present in
this model, and have the same parameterized influence weights, the added influences of
Coalition Combat Operations on Insurgent Organizational Mechanisms and Resources
insert new balance to the system. Thus, this model does not react adversely to increases
in the allocation of resources to Coalition Combat Operations up to 75 percent. Figure
54 is a comparative plot that graphs Popular Support as Coalition Investment is adjusted
from five to 75 percent towards Coalition Combat Operations. Figure 55 shows the
system behavior for a Coalition Investment of 55 percent towards Coalition Combat
Operations. These plots shows that the system is able to self-regulate its behavior; even
though Coalition Combat Operations is vastly over-funded when compared to Host
Nation Capacity and Information Operations, the value of the security element still
reduces drastically after the short-term and is only present in relatively low quantities
throughout the mid-term. But, Popular Support and Host Nation Capacity are still able
to rise considerably and Insurgent Activities are virtually eliminated by the end of the
simulation.
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(1) 5% Coalition Investment to Security
(2) 15% Coalition Investment to Security
(3) 25% Coalition Investment to Security
(4) 35% Coalition Investment to Security
(5) 45% Coalition Investment to Security
(6) 55% Coalition Investment to Security
(7) 65% Coalition Investment to Security
(8) 75% Coalition Investment to Security

Figure 54: Comparative Plot of the behavior of Popular Support in the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy model given incrementally increasing allocation of Coalition
Investment to Combat Operations. The plot ranges from 5% to 75% allocation towards
Combat Operations and the remainder is equally distributed to Host Nation Capacity, and
Information Operations.

Careful observation of the behaviors shown in Figure 54 provides insight into the balance
between the military and political components that has been discusses throughout this
section. First, it is apparent that one behavior pattern in the plot, the one pertaining to
five percent allocation of Coalition Investment to Coalition Combat Operations, does not
follow the same trace as the others. This is explained by the growth of Insurgent
Activities that drives down Popular Support because enough Coalition Combat
Operations are not working to limit the insurgent’s direct negative effects over the
population. But, even though this plot does not reach the same levels as the others in this
graph, it still maintains positive values of Popular Support and positive growth. This is
attributed to the structure of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model that, in
contrast to the other models, adjusts the need for Coalition Combat Operations based on
multiple factors: Coalition Investment and Insurgent Activities. What is essentially
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occurring is that even though the initial planning requirements called for lower levels of
combat troops, the heightened level of Insurgent Activities has triggered a redistribution
of resources to introduce more troops as a response. This introduction of coalition forces
afterwards helps to eventually grow Popular Support, but the timeline is substantially
delayed because of the initial miscalculation.
From the remaining plots in Figure 54 we can see that higher initial allocation of
Coalition Investment towards Coalition Combat Operations causes a short-term decrease
in Popular Support that is attributed to the emergence of Feelings of Resentment. But, as
was see in the Hearts and Minds model, these feelings are primarily mitigated by the
introduction of effective Information Operations. Also, those higher initial levels of
combat troops lead to a quicker reduction of Insurgent Activities and prolonged growth of
Host Nation Capacity and Popular Support during the mid- and long-term periods.

(1) Popular Support for Host Nation
(2) Coalition Combat Operations
(3) Host Nation Security Forces
(4) Host Nation Capacity
(5) Insurgent Activities

Figure 55: Emergent Behavior of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy, given
allocation of Coalition Investment following Security-focused strategy: 55% to Coalition
Combat Operations and 45% equally to Host Nation Capacity and Information
Operations.
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The results of these simulations and the observations gained from the construction of this
and the other models provide a great addition to the body of counterinsurgency
knowledge. The next chapter will further discuss the findings and recommendations that
can be derived from this study. Furthermore, it proposes additional research areas that
will serve to further this topic’s understanding.
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V. Discussion and Conclusions

The models developed during this research add to the existing body of knowledge on
counterinsurgency and contribute greatly to the information available to the policy
makers tasked with our nation’s security. This study has aggregated a wide depth and
breadth of counterinsurgency lessons in order to generate models for two classic
approaches: Hearts and Minds and Cost Benefit Theory. The methodology employed in
generating the system models for these strategies provided insight into their structures
and behavior that enabled the construction of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy
model. This new perspective on the issues of counterinsurgency combines Hearts and
Minds’ focus on gaining support from the local population by emphasizing the political
components of the fight, while incorporating the accountability principals from Cost
Benefit Theory that center on eliminating resources that are useful to the insurgency and
diminishing the benefits of their actions. From this model, the elements of security,
information superiority, and harvesting the local government’s capacity have come to the
forefront as the most important attributes of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy.
It is equally important to note that this model serves only as a representation of
the system’s behavior. It is unreasonable for a decision maker to expect definitive
timelines or values from this or any other System Dynamics model. The true benefits of
the model come from understanding the system’s construction and the influences that tie
each of the model’s elements together; it is these influences that give the model its
characteristic behavior and value.
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Many have proposed ways in which current counterinsurgency strategy can be
improved; such as reorganizing the counterinsurgency force around the Provincial
Reconstruction Team construct (Long, 2006), establishing permanent advisory specialties
(Nagl, 2007), or utilizing a wide range of airpower assets more effectively (Dunlap,
2007). But, most seem to agree there is no “silver bullet” response to the
counterinsurgency issue. This research does not intend to be a definitive solution for
counterinsurgency strategic planning or a tool to measure perceived support for a certain
amount of investment. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to add to the knowledge
that exists on counterinsurgency strategy and for each of the recommendations that have
been derived from the study to be able to contribute to the decision making process. The
insight gained from the construction of these models, the identification of the system
influences, and the emergent behavior patterns fulfill this goal.

Security is Key
The first section of recommendations will focus on the military component of the
counterinsurgency fight. Attempting to determine the most optimum relationship
between this and the political elements has been highly debated throughout the history of
counterinsurgency. Revolutionaries and counterinsurgents alike have time and again
made suggestions that seem to downplay the role of conventional military operations in
the irregular environment (Galula, 1964; O’Neill, 2001). This assumption has been
continually promoted by current doctrine and demonstrated by ongoing operations (FM
3-24, 2006). But, as at least one war fighter’s example, suggests that these guidelines
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may not always apply. The case of the First Armored Division’s evolving mission during
2007 serves as an excellent example of how these long-standing metrics may require a
closer look. This unit initially estimated that only 30 percent of their missions would
involve combat operations and they entered Northern Iraq structured around this
assumption. But, as the fighting in the north began to intensify because of migration of
insurgent forces from Baghdad and other former strongholds, the commanders shaped
their force structure to meet these challenges (Shaker, 2009).
The example of the First Armored Division in Iraq underscores one of the
recommendations that can be extracted from the development of the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy. While the Hearts and Minds model demonstrated that a
combat-focused strategy would fail to gain the necessary popular support because of the
emergence of resentment among the locals, the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy
suggests that the long term implications of popular support are less dependent on the
amount of security forces employed during an operation, but more so on the timeline
associated with their deployment. The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model’s
simulation proposes that combat forces employed during the short-term period provides
the greatest effects on training host nation personnel for ongoing security and disrupting
the insurgent’s organizational structures and availability to resources that will permit the
growth of the local government’s capacity during the long-term. This model, which was
not developed by focusing on any particular conflict or range of operational conditions,
mimics the “surge” conditions implemented in Iraq in early 2007 that have lead to
improved security and stabilization efforts (Nagl, 2002; Downey, et al., 2008). The
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development of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model also suggests that security
operations must be conducted by focusing on developing host nation security forces, and
establishing and maintaining effective border security.
The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy maintains the contribution of Baker’s
(2006) initial development of the Hearts and Minds model that included resentment as the
defining element that countered the balance that existed between popular support and the
military and political elements. This model takes that premise one step further and
combines it with the theory that host nation security forces would not encourage the
development of these feelings (Nagl, 2008). The Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy
advocates for a strong reliance on training host nation security forces in order to limit the
effects of resentment on popular support and to aid in the building of host nation
capacity. Some have suggested that this can be best accomplished by reorganizing the
military’s advisory role into a formal military specialty (Nagl, 2007), but with care to not
tip the balance of power away from maintaining future force structure requirements for
emerging conventional and irregular threats (Haddick, 2008). Others have also
advocated that this advisory mission is the ideal source of cross-service integration of
expertise and assets into the joint counterinsurgency arsenal. Kostelnik (2006) and
Brown (2008) suggest that Air Force Security Force and Civil Engineers have specialized
skill sets that have been de-emphasized by their Army and Marine Corp counterparts and
that these would serve to greatly increase the training capability of host nation forces and
the local government’s capabilities.
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Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy also suggests that an increased stance on
border security is critical to limiting the resources that are available to the insurgency,
and thus their ability to organize and conduct operations. This element stems from the
construction of the Cost Benefit Theory model and has also been advocated by other
studies (Long, 2006). This research suggests that insurgent organizational mechanisms
depend on inputs from internal and external resource suppliers. Even though some of the
resources that can be made available to the insurgency come directly from the host nation
or coalition in the form of aid intended for the population, the Hybrid Counterinsurgency
Strategy model proposes that effective security combined with intelligence and
information operations can substantially diminish the availability of local and foreign
resources. The topic of information operations opens the discussion into the next area of
recommendations suggested by this study.

Focus on Information
Perhaps one of the most unexpected findings of this research was the importance of
information operations on counterinsurgency systems. Every strategy modeled
maintained some influence from information operations, but the lack of literary and
doctrinal focus on this element seemed to imply that very little weight has been given to
its contribution. Prior to 2006, with the publication of FM 3-24, none of the classic
proponents or emerging strategies focused around maintaining a robust information
operations structure. But the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy proposes that
information operations is the single most influential element in the counterinsurgency
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system. The model’s construction and simulations demonstrate information operations
influences on reducing resentment, bolstering the effects of the local government’s
capacity, enabling the limitation of resources available to the insurgency and projecting
the reach of the host nation and coalition directly to the population in an effort to gain
their support. This element of the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model relied
heavily on the information obtained from constructing the Hearts and Minds model.
Simulation from this initial development suggested that if a strategy lacked the inclusion
of information operations, then the added investment going towards the security and
capacity-building elements would not be enough to counteract the effects of the
insurgency and the emergence of the population’s resentment.
Recently several perspectives on the value of information in counterinsurgency
have begun to surface. Steele (2006) suggested that information operations have recently
come to the forefront of national strategic planning and that its contributions are
especially critical to the development of early warning, peacekeeping, and stabilization
and reconstruction. He also advocated for the development of a National Information
Council to serve at the same level as the National Security Council. With regards to the
specific contributions of information operations to counterinsurgency, Helmus (2007)
proposed that the methods with which a campaign’s effectiveness is communicated to the
population are just as important as the actions themselves. This RAND study focuses on
utilizing the current elements of information operations, such as public affairs and
psychological operations, and applying the principles developed for business marketing
by managing expectation, tailoring stabilization efforts to meet individual “customer”
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needs, and obtaining feedback from the population in order to measure the
counterinsurgency’s effectiveness. When marketing security, reconstruction, and
stabilization, like in marketing for a business, the information disseminated must be
factual and valuable to the audience.

Build Capacity
An unknown author said: “Give a man a fish; you have fed him for today. Teach a man
to fish; and you have fed him for a lifetime.” Building the host nation's capability is not
about introducing humanitarian assistance and investing in new buildings or
infrastructure for the sake of spending money towards reconstruction. This factor, as
designed into the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model, originates from the
individual focuses from Hearts and Minds on reestablishing essential services, stabilizing
the host nation's economy, and gaining legitimacy for the government. This broad area
must be addressed by a multifaceted approach that addresses the individual needs of each
component (Thompson, 1970). Referring back to the fishing proverb, it can now be said
that: “Build a school during a counterinsurgency and it will be attacked. Teach the
community how to build that school and they will have it for a lifetime.”
This statement underscores two points that are addressed by the Hybrid
Counterinsurgency Strategy. First, the model suggests that more influence is given to
popular support when the investment comes in the form of action by the host nation's
government rather than the foreign coalition's support. As discussed before, the elements
of host nation security forces and local government's capacity directly influence positive
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growth of popular support, whereas the coalition's combat involvement may diminish
support as a consequence of increasing feelings of resentment. Also, information
operations work to directly influence support from the population but requires input from
the host nation's actions in order to spread the word of stabilization and progress.
Second, there exists a sense of accomplishment and pride when the work is completed by
the merits and hard work of the population itself. This factor, which is seldom accounted
for in studies and strategies, contributes to the capacity of the host nation.
Another issue that has recently been discussed and also falls under the category of
building capacity is the diplomatic effort that must be present throughout the
counterinsurgency campaign. Typically strategists do not consider this to be a military
role, but one better suited for civilian diplomats. But this assumption may require serious
reconsidering. Long (2006) suggested that amnesty and reward programs directed at
employing former insurgents to work for the host nation government should become an
integral part of irregular warfare planning. He warned that a prolonged battle of attrition
would be counterproductive to the overall efforts of the counterinsurgency. He also
suggested that reward programs target information gathering that can lead to the capture
of insurgents, bomb-makers, and criminals. The effects would again institute a certain
level of pride in the population that their efforts are contributing to the stabilization of
their country while being supplemented by a monetary reward. Along with the rapid
increase in troop levels in Iraq that occurred in 2007, the commanders also instituted a
limited amnesty program that brought former militants under the influence of the local
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government for an investment of approximately ten dollars per day and created
essentially a “neighborhood watch on steroids.” (Nagl, 2008)

Suggested Future Research

Throughout the development of these models, the goal has been to simulate the model
behaviors in order to understand their construction and determine their emergent behavior
patterns. This processes served to achieve the objectives of this research: to consolidate
counterinsurgency knowledge, to then use that knowledge in developing the models of
current strategies, and finally to develop a comprehensive hybrid strategy with the insight
gained from the prior models’ influences and behaviors. One recommendation to further
the counterinsurgency body of knowledge would be to apply these models, particularly
the Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy model, towards historical or notional examples of
a counterinsurgency operation in order to obtain an optimal allocation of resources or to
determine the preferred investment allocation balance according the short-, mid-, and
long-term phases. This type of experimentation with the model’s functionality would
also lend itself to multidimensional analysis of the model’s investment allocation
elements. Another application of this research is to conduct a budgetary analysis of
resources to add to the information that will determine investment allocation, operational
phasing timelines, and the rate of investment withdrawal in response to improving
conditions.
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Conclusion

The initial discussion about the counterinsurgency body of knowledge included one
author’s approximation on the enhanced attention that the study of counterinsurgency has
received as of late. The introduction stated that Dr. David Kilcullen, a senior
counterinsurgency advisor for the US Department of State, estimates that more has been
written on the topic of counterinsurgency in the last four years than in the previous 40.
But the questions still remains unanswered: Why, even with all that has been
documented, are we still struggling to understand this type of warfare? In developing this
research, one line of reasoning that helps to address that question has emerged. Perhaps
the lack of understanding has not been due to the lack of study, but to the way that the
vast majority have sought to analyze the problem.
This research approaches the study of counterinsurgency from a drastically
different point of view. Whereas most studies and references have focused on case
examples or have attempted to develop predictive models from past conflicts in order to
suggest what approach can be taken in another. In the case of this research, System
Dynamics has allowed this study to focus on the mechanics of counterinsurgencies as
complex social systems that have demonstrated consistent behavior patterns and
influences at the structural and elemental levels that are not dependent on the particular
conflict or geographic region. This research provides a critical step forward in the
prolonged understanding of irregular warfare and serves as a key contribution to the
wealth of counterinsurgency knowledge.
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Appendix A: Equations for Flow Diagram of Hearts and Minds Model
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Appendix B: Equations for Flow Diagram of Cost Benefit Theory Model
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Appendix C: Equations for Flow Diagram of Hybrid Counterinsurgency Strategy
Model
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